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Abstract	  	  	   Under	  President	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  the	  White	  House	  pursued	  a	  complex	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  the	  Contras,	  rebels	  in	  trying	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Sandinista	  regime	  in	  Nicaragua,	  in	  Nicaragua.	  In	  1979,	  the	  leftist	  Sandinista	  government	  seized	  power	  in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  loss	  of	  the	  previous	  pro-­‐United	  States	  Somoza	  military	  dictatorship	  deeply	  troubled	  the	  conservatives,	  for	  whom	  eradication	  of	  communism	  internationally	  was	  a	  top	  foreign	  policy	  goal.	  Consequently,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  sought	  to	  redress	  the	  policy	  of	  his	  predecessor,	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  and	  assume	  a	  hard	  line	  stance	  against	  leftist	  regimes	  in	  Central	  America.	  Reagan	  and	  the	  conservatives	  within	  his	  administration,	  therefore,	  supported	  the	  Contra	  through	  military	  arms,	  humanitarian	  aid,	  and	  financial	  contributions.	  	   This	  intervention	  in	  Nicaragua,	  however,	  failed	  to	  garner	  popular	  support	  from	  American	  citizens	  and	  Democrats.	  Consequently,	  between	  1982	  and	  1984	  Congress	  prohibited	  further	  funding	  to	  the	  Contras	  in	  a	  series	  of	  legislation	  called	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.	  These	  Amendments	  barred	  any	  military	  aid	  from	  reaching	  the	  Contras,	  including	  through	  intelligence	  agencies.	  Shortly	  after	  their	  passage,	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  Director	  William	  Casey	  and	  influential	  members	  of	  Reagan’s	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC)	  including	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Robert	  McFarlane,	  NSC	  Aide	  Oliver	  North,	  and	  Deputy	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  John	  Poindexter	  cooperated	  to	  identify	  and	  exploit	  loopholes	  in	  the	  legislation.	  By	  recognizing	  the	  NSC	  as	  a	  non-­‐intelligence	  body,	  these	  masterminds	  orchestrated	  a
i	  
scheme	  in	  which	  third	  parties,	  including	  foreign	  countries	  and	  private	  donors,	  contributed	  both	  financially	  and	  through	  arms	  donations	  to	  sustain	  the	  Contras	  independently	  of	  Congressional	  oversight.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  mechanism	  and	  process	  of	  soliciting	  donations	  from	  private	  individuals,	  recognizing	  the	  forces	  and	  actors	  that	  created	  a	  situation	  for	  covert	  action	  to	  continue	  without	  detection.	  Oliver	  North,	  the	  main	  actor	  of	  the	  state,	  worked	  within	  his	  role	  as	  an	  NSC	  bureaucrat	  to	  network	  with	  influential	  politicians	  and	  private	  individuals	  to	  execute	  the	  orders	  of	  his	  superiors	  and	  shape	  foreign	  policy.	  Although	  Reagan	  articulated	  his	  desire	  for	  the	  Contras	  to	  remain	  a	  military	  presence	  in	  Nicaragua,	  he	  delegated	  the	  details	  of	  policy	  to	  his	  subordinates,	  which	  allowed	  this	  scheme	  to	  flourish.	  Second,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  individual	  donors,	  analyzing	  their	  role	  as	  private	  citizens	  in	  sustaining	  and	  encouraging	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  The	  Contra	  movement	  found	  non-­‐state	  support	  from	  followers	  of	  the	  New	  Right,	  demonstrated	  through	  financial	  and	  organizational	  assistance,	  that	  allowed	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  statistically	  unpopular	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  to	  continue.	  I	  interpret	  these	  donors	  as	  politically	  involved,	  but	  politically	  philanthropic,	  individuals,	  donating	  to	  their	  charity	  of	  choice	  to	  further	  the	  principles	  of	  American	  freedom	  internationally	  in	  a	  Cold	  War	  environment.	  The	  thesis	  then	  proceeds	  to	  assess	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  other	  political	  actors	  in	  shaping	  policy,	  concluding	  that	  the	  executive	  cannot	  act	  alone	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
1	  
Introduction:	  “A	  Neat	  Idea”	  
	  
	  I	  don't	  think	  it	  was	  wrong.	  I	  think	  it	  was	  a	  neat	  idea	  and	  I	  came	  back	  and	  I	  advocated	  that	  and	  we	  did	  it.	  	   -­‐Oliver	  North,	  July	  8,	  1987;	  Day	  24	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Hearings	  	  	  	   The	  rise	  of	  modern	  conservatism,	  which	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1950’s,	  culminated	  with	  the	  election	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan	  in	  1980.	  The	  New	  Right	  championed	  an	  exaggerated	  pro-­‐American,	  morality-­‐driven	  agenda	  and	  assumed	  a	  hard	  anti-­‐communist	  stance	  internationally.	  These	  political	  priorities	  motivated	  New	  Right	  policymakers	  to	  employ	  interventionist	  policies	  in	  developing	  nations	  to	  gain	  ideological	  control	  against	  the	  Soviets.1	  Conservatives	  championed	  traditional	  American	  ideology,	  claiming	  that	  one	  flaw	  of	  the	  Republican	  administrations,	  prior	  to	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  was	  their	  disregard	  for	  classic	  American	  values	  abroad.	  This	  included	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon’s	  pursuit	  of	  containment	  and	  détenté	  and	  the	  Democratic	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  who	  tried	  to	  negotiate	  with	  communist	  leaders	  and	  “lost”	  Panama.	  After	  the	  U.S.	  defeat	  in	  Vietnam,	  proponents	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  perceived	  a	  disturbing	  trend	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  of	  submitting	  to	  weaker	  powers	  and	  sacrificing	  American	  interests	  abroad.2	  	  	   Reagan’s	  election	  in	  1980	  marked	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  and	  served	  as	  a	  historical	  watershed.	  	  After	  the	  tumultuous	  rise	  of	  the	  New	  Left	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  70’s,	  the	  growth	  of	  Modern	  Conservatism	  provided	  a	  new	  lense	  through	  which	  to	  restore	  American	  superiority	  and	  values	  domestically.	  The	  conservatives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  95.	  2	  Natasha	  Zaretsky,	  “Restraint	  or	  Retreat?	  The	  Debate	  over	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	  and	  US	  Nationalism	  after	  Vietnam,”	  in	  Diplomatic	  History,	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  3	  (2011),	  537.	  
2	  
within	  the	  U.S.	  mobilized	  after	  a	  chaotic	  decade,	  struggling	  through	  an	  identity	  crisis	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unpopular	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  the	  late	  1960’s	  and	  early	  1970’s,	  doubting	  government	  credibility	  following	  Watergate	  in	  the	  1970’s,	  and	  facing	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  U.S.	  position	  abroad	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Iran	  Hostage	  Crisis	  beginning	  in	  1979.	  	  	  	   Reagan’s	  election	  made	  acting	  upon	  that	  vision	  possible.	  Throughout	  the	  Carter	  presidency,	  New	  Right	  politicians	  criticized	  his	  administration	  as	  failing	  to	  defend	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  allowing	  U.S.	  allies	  to	  succumb	  to	  internal	  opposition	  and	  insurgency	  movements.3	  Reagan	  sought	  to	  rebuild	  American	  superiority	  abroad	  through	  a	  major	  defense	  build-­‐up,	  employing	  aggressive	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric	  to	  achieve	  his	  policy	  goals	  and	  rally	  popular	  support.	  Additionally,	  the	  New	  Right	  advocated	  a	  return	  to	  traditional	  institutions,	  like	  the	  Church,	  home,	  and	  community.	  In	  a	  speech	  given	  at	  the	  Annual	  Convention	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Evangelicals	  in	  March	  1983	  in	  Orlando,	  Florida,	  Reagan	  concisely	  demonstrated	  his	  embodiment	  of	  these	  defining	  New	  Right	  principles.	  Initially,	  he	  campaigned	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  introduced	  in	  Congress	  to	  restore	  prayer	  in	  schools	  and	  condemned	  Planned	  Parenthood	  for	  promoting	  promiscuity.	  In	  a	  seamless	  transition,	  he	  compared	  these	  domestic	  evils	  to	  the	  godless	  communists	  in	  the	  USSR,	  calling	  upon	  the	  American	  people	  to	  “ignore…the	  aggressive	  impulses	  of	  an	  evil	  empire”	  and	  return	  America	  to	  its	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  superiority	  both	  home	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Robert	  Holden	  &	  Eric	  Zolov,	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  289.	  
3	  
abroad.4	  The	  values	  and	  goals	  articulated	  by	  Reagan	  demonstrated	  the	  New	  Right’s	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  tradition	  and	  American	  resurgence	  in	  all	  aspects.	  	  	   To	  achieve	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Soviet	  evil	  empire,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  engaged	  in	  a	  series	  of	  proxy	  wars	  designed	  to	  weaken	  the	  Soviets	  militarily	  and	  decrease	  their	  international	  strength.	  In	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  early	  1980’s,	  when	  the	  Afghan	  communist	  party	  fell	  apart,	  the	  Soviets	  intervened	  in	  the	  neighboring	  state	  to	  try	  and	  reinstall	  the	  leftist	  regime.	  This	  Soviet	  intervention	  was	  seen	  by	  the	  West,	  including	  the	  U.S.	  and	  neighboring	  countries,	  as	  proof	  of	  aggressive	  intent	  in	  maintaining	  and	  spreading	  communist	  ideology.5	  In	  response,	  the	  US	  formed	  a	  strong	  military	  relationship	  with	  the	  revolutionary	  Mujahedin	  forces	  through	  the	  CIA	  and	  covert	  operations	  to	  bleed	  the	  Soviet	  forces	  in	  Afghanistan.	  In	  this	  mission,	  Reagan’s	  policy	  was	  largely	  successful.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  assistance	  to	  Afghanistan	  was	  to	  remove	  Soviet	  influence,	  and	  this	  end	  was	  achieved.	  By	  engaging	  in	  this	  conflict,	  the	  US	  depleted	  the	  Soviets	  of	  military	  strength,	  using	  the	  Afghan	  forces	  to	  kill	  Soviet	  soldiers	  and	  destroy	  expensive	  equipment.	  In	  the	  mid	  1990’s,	  the	  Afghanis	  tortured	  and	  killed	  the	  last	  Soviet	  installed	  Afghani	  leader	  following	  the	  Soviet	  withdraw	  in	  defeat.6	  	  	   Similarly,	  the	  U.S.	  intervened	  militarily	  in	  Grenada	  and	  engaged	  in	  a	  proxy	  war	  in	  1983	  to	  constrain	  the	  Soviets.	  As	  a	  leftist	  regime	  emerged	  in	  Grenada,	  Regan	  sought	  to	  prevent	  further	  growth	  of	  Communist	  or	  Soviet-­‐friendly	  power	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Reagan,	  Ronald,	  "Remarks	  at	  the	  Annual	  Convention	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Evangelicals	  in	  Orlando,	  Florida	  March	  8,	  1983	  ,"	  online,	  <http://www.reaganfoundation.org/>.	  	  5	  Westad,	  322.	  	  6	  Ibid,	  378.	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support	  the	  prior	  government,	  which	  cooperated	  with	  U.S.	  interests.	  The	  administration	  hoped	  to	  restore	  democracy	  in	  Grenada,	  while	  also	  demonstrating	  the	  US	  anti-­‐communist	  resolve,	  and	  emphasized	  the	  island	  as	  a	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  colony.7	  This	  pattern	  of	  intervention	  in	  states	  of	  Soviet	  expansion	  in	  other	  nations	  led	  to	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua	  to	  eradicate	  the	  leftist	  Sandinistas.	  	  True	  to	  his	  New	  Right	  loyalties,	  Reagan’s	  highest	  foreign	  policy	  commitment	  was	  the	  eradication	  of	  communism,	  especially	  in	  neighboring	  Latin	  America.	  Reagan	  only	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  a	  handful	  of	  foreign	  policy	  issues,	  and	  the	  Contras—anti-­‐communist	  guerrillas	  in	  Nicaragua—had	  captivated	  his	  attention.8	  In	  Nicaragua,	  the	  Sandinista	  government	  overthrew	  the	  Somoza	  family’s	  military	  dictatorship	  in	  1979.	  Reagan	  believed	  the	  Sandinistas,	  a	  leftist	  political	  regime,	  had	  ties	  to	  both	  Fidel	  Castro	  in	  Cuba	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Accordingly,	  immediately	  after	  assuming	  office	  in	  1981,	  Reagan	  ordered	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  Director	  William	  Casey	  to	  organize	  and	  mobilize	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  guerrilla	  forces	  comprised	  of	  pro-­‐Somoza	  Nicaraguan	  exiles.9	  Reagan	  believed	  President	  Carter’s	  attempts	  at	  constructive	  engagement	  demonstrated	  weakness	  and	  allowed	  for	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐friendly	  Somoza	  regime.10	  New	  Right	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  U.S.	  superiority	  internationally,	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  final	  defeat	  of	  communism,	  propelled	  Reagan	  to	  seek	  remedy	  to	  the	  perceived	  failures	  of	  the	  previous	  administrations	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Thomas	  Carothers,	  "The	  Reagan	  Years:	  the	  1980s,"Exporting	  Democracy,	  ed.	  Abraham	  Lowenthal	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  105.	  8	  Michael	  Schaller,	  Reckoning	  Reagan,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  147.	  9	  Ibid,	  150.	  10	  Thomas	  Carothers,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  Democracy:	  US	  Policy	  Toward	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Years	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1991),	  92.	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overthrow	  regimes,	  like	  the	  Sandinistas,	  that	  were	  bastions	  of	  communist	  theory	  and	  therefore	  hostile	  to	  notions	  of	  American	  freedom.	  Between	  1982-­‐1987,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  pursued	  a	  complex	  foreign	  policy	  against	  the	  Contra	  forces	  in	  Nicaragua,	  seeking	  to	  assist	  counter-­‐revolutionaries	  to	  expel	  the	  leftist	  regime.	  Beginning	  in	  1982,	  los	  
contrarrevolucionarios,	  translated	  to	  the	  counterrevolutionaries,	  or	  Contras,	  as	  the	  guerrilla	  fighters	  were	  called,	  were	  sustained	  nearly	  entirely	  on	  indirectly	  routed	  American	  funding.11	  The	  CIA	  and	  National	  Security	  Council	  ran	  this	  covert	  operation	  mostly	  from	  non-­‐traditional	  channels,	  subverting	  congressional	  control	  and	  using	  the	  power	  of	  the	  executive	  to	  finance	  an	  underground	  war	  that	  continued	  until	  1989.	  As	  historian	  Thomas	  Carothers	  summarizes,	  “the	  war	  against	  the	  Sandinistas	  spanned	  all	  eight	  years	  of	  the	  Reagan	  presidency	  and	  was	  a	  policy	  of	  extraordinary	  controversy	  that	  absorbed	  incalculable	  amounts	  of	  the	  administration’s	  energy	  and	  had	  only	  ambiguous	  effects.”12	  	  The	  Contras,	  while	  receiving	  state-­‐sponsored	  funding,	  did	  not	  subsist	  on	  solely	  congressional-­‐approved	  funding.	  In	  1982,	  Democratic	  Representative	  Edward	  Boland	  from	  Massachusetts	  proposed	  a	  bill	  that	  limited	  the	  money	  and	  supplies	  the	  U.S.	  was	  sending	  to	  the	  guerrilla	  fighters.	  	  The	  bill	  limited	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  provide	  taxpayer	  funds	  for	  Contra	  supplies	  and	  training	  due	  to	  the	  ingenuity	  of	  the	  Administration;	  however,	  the	  Contras	  remained	  well	  supported.	  National	  Security	  Aide	  Oliver	  North	  ultimately	  took	  credit	  for	  the	  “neat	  idea”	  of	  funneling	  money	  to	  the	  Contras	  through	  non-­‐traditional	  channels	  from	  third	  party	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Schaller,	  Reckoning	  Reagan,	  150.	  12	  Carothers,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  Democracy,	  77.	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donors,	  including	  private	  individuals,	  think	  tanks,	  and	  other	  nations.	  Unlike	  other	  foreign	  policy	  goals,	  which	  typically	  form	  through	  congressional	  approval,	  the	  policy	  supporting	  the	  Contras	  demonstrated	  the	  covert	  and	  potentially	  illegal	  foreign	  policy	  pursued	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  in	  Nicaragua.	  	  In	  any	  analysis	  of	  Reagan,	  one	  must	  recognize	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  President	  as	  an	  individual	  and	  the	  policy	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  administration.	  Reagan	  was	  infamous	  for	  his	  simultaneous	  disinterest	  in	  details	  and	  strong	  convictions	  in	  overarching	  goals,	  like	  the	  eradication	  of	  communism	  in	  Latin	  America.13	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  policy	  coming	  from	  the	  federal	  government,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  policy	  from	  the	  collective	  and	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  that	  collective.	  	  These	  non-­‐traditional	  channels	  included	  a	  variety	  of	  covert	  operations,	  including	  foreign	  donations	  and	  arms	  sales	  profits.	  Domestically,	  they	  centered	  on	  large	  donations	  from	  wealthy	  conservative	  donors	  transferred	  through	  lobbying	  and	  interest	  organizations.	  To	  successfully	  carry	  out	  this	  elaborate	  funding	  scheme,	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  cooperated	  to	  raise	  and	  quietly	  transmit	  money	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  Contra	  fighters.	  This	  cooperation	  exemplified	  the	  political	  philosophy	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  through	  its	  emphasis	  on	  traditional	  values,	  quietly	  executed	  to	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  U.S.	  without	  allowing	  for	  the	  liberal	  dissidents	  of	  the	  leftist	  movement	  to	  interfere	  and	  sacrifice	  American	  superiority.	  Reagan,	  who	  dubbed	  his	  opponents	  in	  Congress	  as	  a	  “meddlesome	  committee	  of	  535”	  directed	  his	  support	  staff	  to	  circumvent	  the	  law	  if	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  Thomas	  Carothers,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  Democracy:	  US	  Policy	  Toward	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  Reagan	  
Years	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1991).	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goals.14	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  complex	  foreign	  policy	  used	  to	  support	  the	  Contras	  emerged	  with	  the	  crucial	  support	  of	  individuals	  like	  Oliver	  North	  and	  Spitz	  Channell,	  the	  director	  of	  multiple	  interest	  groups	  and	  non-­‐profit	  fundraising	  organizations	  geared	  towards	  supporting	  the	  Contras.	  These	  non-­‐state	  actors	  formed	  a	  movement	  in	  which	  private	  citizens	  could	  drive	  policy	  formation,	  proving	  exceptionally	  historically	  significant	  due	  to	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  political	  process	  outside	  of	  channels	  like	  voting	  and	  basic	  activism.	  As	  a	  strong	  movement	  from	  the	  foundation	  of	  society,	  individual	  American	  citizens,	  to	  the	  top	  levels	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  pro-­‐Contra	  movement	  demonstrated	  the	  power	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  support	  of	  government	  policy.	  	  The	  method	  of	  policy	  creation	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  implementation.	  Since	  major,	  private	  donors	  contributed	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  Contras,	  did	  they	  influence	  the	  direction	  of	  policy?	  Did	  policy	  emerge	  from	  channels	  wholly	  independent	  of	  the	  traditional,	  democratic	  processes?	  To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  this	  thesis	  will	  explore	  three	  distinct	  points.	  	  First,	  I	  analyze	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  involvement	  in	  the	  traditional	  and	  nontraditional	  sense.	  By	  this,	  I	  mean	  to	  articulate	  clearly	  how	  the	  Administration	  circumvented	  boundaries	  set	  into	  place	  by	  congress	  to	  continue	  the	  Contra	  war.	  The	  central	  figure	  is	  Oliver	  North,	  a	  mid-­‐level	  bureaucrat	  who	  headlined	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal.	  In	  negotiations	  and	  covert	  operations,	  North	  emerged	  as	  the	  key	  player	  for	  the	  Administration,	  using	  his	  low-­‐profile	  to	  work	  with	  private	  citizens	  and	  also	  connect	  with	  high-­‐level	  political	  figures.	  The	  historiography	  commonly	  depicts	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North	  as	  a	  manipulative	  and	  conniving	  individual	  who	  worked	  alone	  to	  circumvent	  the	  democratic	  process.	  I	  demonstrate,	  however,	  how	  North	  operated	  within	  a	  system	  and	  within	  his	  role	  at	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  to	  allow	  the	  government	  to	  receive	  support	  from	  private	  donors	  and	  influence	  the	  donors	  into	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  relationship.	  Rather	  than	  assigning	  blame,	  I	  will	  assess	  how	  North	  worked	  within	  an	  elaborate	  political	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  his	  superiors	  yet	  keep	  them	  safe	  from	  scrutiny	  and	  political	  harm.	  	  Second,	  I	  analyze	  the	  other	  component	  of	  the	  policy	  process:	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Organized	  by	  Spitz	  Channell,	  among	  others,	  a	  large	  group	  of	  private	  individuals	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  an	  unpopular	  and	  illegal	  policy	  with	  the	  Contras.	  Here,	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  found	  success	  where	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  failed.	  Unencumbered	  by	  Congress,	  non-­‐state	  actors−particularly	  private	  wealthy	  individuals−held	  events,	  fundraisers,	  and	  awareness	  meetings	  to	  raise	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  funding	  for	  the	  Contras.	  These	  donors	  did	  not	  contribute	  the	  majority	  of	  third-­‐party	  Contra	  funding,	  but	  the	  channels	  in	  which	  they	  organized	  and	  contributed	  remain	  significant	  due	  to	  the	  political	  implications	  and	  revolutionary	  role	  of	  private	  citizens	  within	  state	  function.	  Operating	  multiple	  non-­‐profit,	  tax	  exempt	  organizations,	  Channell	  provided	  the	  mechanism	  for	  state	  actors,	  like	  North,	  to	  raise	  and	  funnel	  the	  money	  from	  the	  donors	  into	  supplies	  and	  training	  for	  the	  Contras.	  By	  tracing	  appearances,	  fundraising	  events,	  and	  the	  communications	  between	  North	  and	  Channell,	  I	  illustrate	  the	  unique	  path	  of	  policy	  formulation,	  analyzing	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  act	  outside	  its	  traditional	  confines	  and	  circumvent	  the	  democratic	  process.	  
9	  
Through	  an	  analysis	  of	  these	  two	  contributing	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  political	  entities,	  I	  seek	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  executive’s	  monopoly	  on	  violence	  and	  foreign	  policy	  making	  is	  a	  false	  conception.	  Many	  scholars	  during	  and	  after	  the	  1980’s	  have	  examined	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  crisis	  and	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Contras.15	  Many	  of	  these	  accounts	  have	  characterized	  the	  actors	  as	  operating	  illegally	  in	  relations	  with	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  Contras.16	  Since	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  was	  the	  defining	  scandal	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  the	  extensive	  existing	  historical	  narrative	  provides	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  the	  atrocities	  of	  the	  Contras,	  networks	  of	  third-­‐country	  funding,	  and	  Oliver	  North	  personally.	  There	  has,	  however,	  been	  very	  little	  research	  done	  on	  how	  non-­‐state	  actors	  fit	  into	  the	  diplomacy	  and	  policymaking	  process.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  not	  to	  recount	  the	  Oliver	  North	  story,	  but	  rather	  to	  analyze	  the	  system	  he	  exploited	  and	  the	  individuals	  that	  made	  his	  maneuvering	  possible.	  A	  large	  bureaucratic	  network,	  including	  the	  NSC,	  CIA,	  and	  other	  governmental	  agencies,	  holds	  a	  substantial	  stake	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  policy.	  Actors	  like	  North,	  who	  hold	  seemingly	  powerless	  political	  positions,	  can	  utilize	  and	  create	  extensive	  networks	  to	  manipulate	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  Through	  manipulating	  the	  elaborate	  political	  system,	  not	  by	  any	  extraordinary	  ability,	  these	  actors	  provide	  policy	  direction	  using	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  	  Holly	  Sklar,	  Washington’s	  War	  on	  Nicaragua	  (Boston,	  MA:	  South	  End	  Press,	  1988);	  Peter	  Kornbluh,	  Nicaragua:	  The	  Price	  of	  Intervention	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Institute	  for	  Policy	  Studies,	  1987);	  David	  Ryan,	  US-­Sandinista	  Diplomatic	  Relations	  (New	  York:	  St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  Inc,	  1995);	  William	  M.	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1998);	  Roy	  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy:	  The	  Making	  of	  American	  Policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  1981-­1987	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1988).	  	  16	  See	  Greg	  Grandin,	  Empire’s	  Workshop:	  Latin	  America,	  The	  U.S.,	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  New	  Imperialism	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  LLC,	  2006);	  Robert	  Pastor,	  Not	  Condemned	  to	  Repetition:	  the	  US	  
and	  Nicaragua	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  2002);	  William	  Kamman,	  A	  Search	  for	  Stability:	  US	  
Diplomacy	  Toward	  Nicaragua	  (Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1968);	  Morris	  Morley,	  
Washington,	  Somoza,	  and	  the	  Sandinistas	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994).	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outside	  funding,	  successfully	  circumventing	  the	  legislature	  and	  other	  designed	  checks	  on	  the	  executive	  branch.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  disrupts	  the	  delicate	  political	  balance,	  violating	  the	  constitutional	  limits	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  and	  allowing	  for	  policy	  implementation,	  like	  that	  in	  Nicaragua,	  where	  not	  only	  do	  normal	  citizens	  remain	  misinformed	  but	  so	  too	  does	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  government.	  North’s	  “neat	  idea”	  may	  not	  have	  been	  his	  own	  brainchild,	  but	  the	  system	  in	  place	  fostered	  underground	  political	  maneuvering	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  national	  security.	  Essentially,	  this	  analysis	  and	  case	  study	  demonstrates	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  stop	  at	  nothing	  to	  achieve	  a	  policy	  goal	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  engaged,	  wealthy,	  politically	  minded	  citizens.	  
11	  
Chapter	  1:	  From	  the	  White	  House	  	   The	  making	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  is	  a	  complex	  process.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  messy	  process,	  for	  the	  variety	  of	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  that	  affect	  US	  foreign	  policy	  do	  not	  stand	  still,	  but	  constantly	  interact	  and	  impact	  on	  one	  another.	  	   -­‐Jerel	  Rosati17	  	  
	  
	  	   In	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua,	  Rosati’s	  depection	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  could	  not	  more	  perfectly	  describe	  the	  path	  of	  foreign	  policy	  formation	  and	  implementation.	  The	  Contras,	  comprised	  of	  military	  leaders	  from	  the	  past,	  authoritarian,	  U.S.-­‐friendly,	  Somoza	  regime	  and	  various	  guerrilla	  fighters,	  sought	  to	  overthrow	  the	  leftist	  Sandinista	  government.	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  employed	  financial	  and	  military	  aid	  to	  support	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua	  in	  their	  efforts	  and	  saw	  this	  internal	  authority	  conflict	  as	  a	  central	  security	  interest.	  This	  chapter	  views	  the	  events	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  White	  House	  and	  federal	  government,	  analyzing	  the	  actors,	  congressional	  discussions,	  and	  priorities	  until	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal	  broke.	  Although	  Ronald	  Reagan	  claimed	  complete	  innocence	  regarding	  the	  latter,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Oliver	  North,	  cohesively	  orchestrated	  a	  pragmatic	  scheme	  between	  1983	  and	  1986	  to	  gain	  money	  from	  wealthy	  donors	  to	  continue	  their	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  in	  the	  face	  of	  congressional	  resistance.	  	  This	  broad	  plan	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  which	  sought	  to	  engage	  in	  peaceful	  negotiations	  rather	  than	  aggressively	  control	  the	  Central	  American	  region.	  To	  conservative	  critics	  of	  Carter,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Jerel	  A.	  Rosati,	  The	  Politics	  of	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Fort	  Worth:	  Harcourt,	  Brace,	  Jovanovich,	  1993),	  3.	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his	  relinquishment	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  the	  increased	  Soviet	  presence	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  inability	  to	  end	  to	  hostage	  crisis	  in	  Iran	  indicated	  a	  U.S.	  retreat	  in	  the	  international	  sphere.18	  In	  Nicaragua,	  Carter	  saw	  withdraw	  of	  military	  aid	  as	  a	  proper	  punishment	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  of	  the	  Somoza	  dictatorship.19	  Additionally,	  Carter	  expressed	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  nonintervention,	  arguing	  that	  the	  best	  path	  to	  maintaining	  favorable	  international	  relationships	  was	  to	  respect	  the	  affairs	  and	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  states.	  Critics	  saw	  the	  Carter	  Administration’s	  acceptance	  of	  détente	  as	  a	  submission	  to	  Soviet	  expansion	  in	  the	  third	  world	  and	  sought	  to	  reverse	  this	  trend	  through	  increased	  aggression	  and	  repossession	  of	  neighboring	  nations	  into	  American	  influence.20	  	  As	  part	  of	  a	  global	  strategy	  to	  defeat	  communism,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  pursued	  an	  aggressive	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  by	  supporting	  the	  Contra	  fighters.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Carter	  administration,	  right-­‐wing	  intellectuals	  advocated	  for	  increased	  U.S.	  aggression	  and	  many	  played	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.	  The	  Committee	  of	  Sante	  Fe,	  composed	  of	  L.	  Francis	  Bouchey,	  Roger	  Fontaine,	  David	  C.	  Jordan,	  Lieutenant	  General	  Gordon	  Sumner	  Jr.,	  and	  Lewis	  Tambs,	  articulated	  a	  platform	  in	  a	  document	  drafted	  in	  1980	  calling	  for	  the	  end	  of	  Soviet	  Communist	  influences	  in	  Latin	  America.21	  Fountaine,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  William	  M.	  Leogrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard:	  The	  United	  States	  in	  Central	  American,	  1977-­1992	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1998),	  52.	  	  19	  Ibid,	  19.	  	  20	  Ibid,	  53.	  21	  “Saving	  the	  World	  from	  Communism:	  The	  Committee	  of	  Santa	  Fe.”	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  United	  
States,	  ed.	  Robert	  H.	  Holden	  and	  Eric	  Zolov	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  289.	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Sumner,	  and	  Tambs	  later	  joined	  Reagan’s	  	  foreign	  policy	  team,	  indicating	  both	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  document	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  policy	  and	  to	  Reagan	  himself.22	  	  Indeed,	  Reagan	  articulated	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  democratic	  infrastructure	  in	  other	  nations	  in	  a	  speech	  in	  London	  in	  1982.	  This	  speech	  was	  a	  key	  step	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  administration’s	  “democratic	  initiative	  policy,”	  which	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.23	  Additionally,	  in	  1983	  Reagan	  assembled	  a	  National	  Bipartisan	  Comission	  on	  Central	  America,	  a	  twelve	  person	  conservative	  panel	  lead	  by	  Henry	  Kissenger,	  to	  analyze	  the	  region	  and	  provide	  recommendations	  for	  policy	  action	  in	  the	  area.	  This	  report,	  which	  Reagan	  reviewed	  as	  “magnificent,”	  recognized	  that	  any	  problems	  in	  Central	  America,	  for	  example,	  communist	  sympathetic	  regimes,	  equated	  to	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  U.S.24	  In	  1984,	  Reagan	  described	  the	  Sandinistas	  as	  “a	  communist	  reign	  of	  terror,”	  imparting	  the	  fear	  of	  Soviet	  Russia	  onto	  the	  leftist	  Central	  American	  government.25	  The	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  having	  fully	  matured	  by	  1985,	  swore	  not	  to	  break	  faith	  with	  nations	  that	  were	  susceptible	  to	  Soviet	  sponsored	  aggression.26	  In	  Latin	  America,	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  guided	  in	  the	  administration	  to	  eradicate	  what	  it	  perceived	  as	  Soviet	  and	  Cuban	  penetration	  into	  the	  backyard	  and	  sphere	  of	  influence	  of	  the	  U.S.27	  The	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  shaped	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  1980’s,	  emphasizing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Ibid.	  23	  Congressional	  Research	  Service.	  Non-­‐Classified	  Report.	  “Public	  Diplomacy,	  Project	  Democracy,	  and	  Contra	  Aid,”	  Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive:	  Nicaragua.	  August	  1987.	  Item	  Number:	  NI03018.	  24	  Robert	  Holden	  and	  Eric	  Zolov,	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  United	  States:	  A	  Documentary	  History	  “Central	  America	  in	  Revolt:	  A	  Reagan	  Administration	  View”	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  292.	  	  25	  Robert	  Holden	  and	  Eric	  Zolov,	  “Fear	  of	  Communism	  in	  Central	  America,”	  296.	  	  26	  James	  M.	  Scott,	  "Interbranch	  Rivalry	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Nicaragua,"	  Political	  Science	  
Quarterly,	  112,	  no.	  2	  (1997):	  237.	  	  27	  Thomas	  Carothers,	  "The	  Reagan	  Years:	  the	  1980s,"Exporting	  Democracy,	  ed.	  Abraham	  Lowenthal	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  91.	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importance	  of	  Central	  America	  due	  to	  its	  geographic	  proximity	  and	  believed	  Soviet	  influence	  in	  the	  emerging	  leftist	  regimes,	  like	  the	  Sandinistas.	  Scholars	  have	  extensively	  analyzed	  the	  role	  of	  Vietnam	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.	  For	  the	  New	  Right,	  defeat	  and	  withdraw	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  Vietnam	  signified	  the	  end	  of	  America’s	  global	  superiority.28	  This	  lasting	  political	  attitude,	  called	  Vietnam	  Syndrome,	  polarized	  the	  American	  people	  into	  two	  camps:	  those	  who	  opposed	  all	  military	  intervention	  for	  fear	  of	  defeat,	  and	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  reassert	  American	  dominance	  through	  an	  increased	  military	  presence.29	  Reagan	  and	  his	  New	  Right	  cohorts	  fell	  definitively	  into	  the	  latter	  of	  the	  two	  ideologies.	  I	  accept	  the	  widely	  held	  interpretation	  that	  Reagan	  sought	  to	  neutralize	  the	  defeatist	  Vietnam	  Syndrome	  in	  the	  American	  population,	  through	  his	  determination	  to	  reinstate	  U.S.	  superiority	  militarily	  by	  the	  eradication	  of	  communist	  friendly	  regimes	  in	  Latin	  America.30	  	  The	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  articulated	  through	  Reagan’s	  ideological	  rhetoric,	  left	  concrete	  policy	  up	  for	  interpretation	  by	  his	  advisors	  and	  administration	  officials.	  Although	  the	  aforementioned	  documents	  guided	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  the	  President	  never	  clearly	  articulated	  definite	  and	  strategic	  pathways	  of	  policy	  implementation.	  Reagan	  sought	  to	  eradicate	  communism	  globally	  and	  reinstate	  traditional	  Christian	  values	  domestically.	  The	  strategy	  of	  policy	  implementation,	  however,	  he	  delegated	  to	  his	  team	  in	  the	  administration.	  The	  funding	  scheme	  for	  the	  Contras	  could	  emerge	  because	  of	  Reagan’s	  intentional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Leogrande,	  6.	  29	  Ibid,	  7.	  	  30	  See	  Parry,	  Robert,	  and	  Peter	  Kornbluh.	  "Iran-­‐Contra's	  Untold	  Story."	  Foreign	  Policy.	  no.	  72	  (1988):	  5.	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distance	  from	  policy	  creation	  and	  comfort	  with	  delegating	  management	  to	  his	  staff.	  Reagan	  provided	  the	  general	  direction,	  but	  relied	  upon	  others	  to	  sort	  out	  the	  minute	  details	  of	  policy	  formation.	  	  The	  Sandinistas	  were	  a	  vital	  component	  of	  this	  perceived	  threat.	  As	  Reagan	  articulated	  in	  a	  1984	  speech,	  the	  Sandistas	  were	  “attempt[ing]	  to	  destabilize	  the	  entire	  region	  and	  eventually	  move	  chaos	  and	  anarchy	  toward	  the	  American	  border.”31	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  the	  elites	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  believed	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Sandinistas	  would	  create	  a	  toppling	  of	  U.S.	  friendly	  regimes	  in	  the	  region	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  leftist,	  hostile	  political	  leaders.	  This	  fear	  stemmed	  from	  the	  domino	  theory	  that	  emerged	  decades	  earlier	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  argued	  that	  Soviet	  influence	  would	  infiltrate	  a	  region	  and	  then	  spread	  to	  the	  neighboring	  states,	  and	  had	  prompted	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  both	  Korea	  and	  Vietnam.	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  believed	  that	  the	  development	  of	  regimes	  in	  Central	  America	  with	  Soviet	  and	  Cuban	  ties	  would	  spread	  rapidly	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  region.	  Reagan	  himself	  viewed	  the	  Sandinistas	  as	  strongly	  committed	  Communists	  engaged	  in	  war	  with	  God	  and	  man,	  believing	  their	  mere	  existence	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  security	  interests.32	  	  The	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  the	  Contras	  extends	  further	  than	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration.	  Dating	  back	  to	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration,	  the	  domino	  theory,	  or	  the	  belief	  that	  Soviet	  expansion	  occurs	  exponentially	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  one	  friendly	  state,	  drove	  the	  New	  Right	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  tally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  "The	  Fear	  of	  Communism	  in	  Central	  America,"	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  ed.	  Robert	  H.	  Holden	  and	  Eric	  Zolov	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  295.	  32	  Christian	  Smith,	  Resisting	  Reagan:	  The	  U.S.	  Central	  America	  Peace	  Movement	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996),	  23-­‐24.	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the	  score	  of	  Soviet	  and	  U.S.	  friendly	  states	  carefully.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Contras	  lost	  Congressional	  funding	  they	  had	  already	  become	  a	  crucial	  security	  interest	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party.	  Reagan,	  therefore,	  saw	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  continue	  their	  support	  to	  redeem	  U.S.	  superiority	  and	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  his	  people.	  	   In	  1981,	  Reagan	  issued	  National	  Security	  Decision	  Directive	  17,	  which	  provided	  for	  “significant	  covert	  activities”	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  Central	  America.33	  Issued	  prior	  to	  any	  prohibition	  on	  Contra	  funding	  by	  Congress,	  like	  N.S.D.D.	  17,	  a	  similarly	  themed	  NSC	  policy	  summary	  in	  1983	  printed	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  entitled	  “US	  Policy	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  Cuba	  Through	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  1984,	  Summary	  Paper”	  called	  for	  a	  refusal	  to	  compromise	  with	  the	  Sandinistas	  and	  to	  approach	  foreign	  policy	  on	  “our	  terms,”	  indicating	  a	  lack	  of	  negotiation.	  Additionally,	  this	  policy	  summary	  noted	  that	  N.S.D.D.	  17	  had	  not	  been	  fully	  implemented,	  and	  requested	  “full	  implementation	  thereof.”34	  The	  Reagan	  administration	  both	  provided	  for	  and	  ordered	  the	  execution	  of	  covert	  action	  in	  the	  Central	  American	  region.	  Although	  later	  limited	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  Congressional	  legislation,	  this	  early	  support	  from	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  for	  intervention	  through	  covert	  channels	  remains	  significant	  as	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  policy	  trend	  toward	  Nicaragua.	  Although	  providing	  for	  covert	  activities,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  implemented	  a	  number	  of	  sanctions	  on	  Nicaragua	  through	  visible	  legal	  channels.	  These	  legal	  and	  widely	  supported	  steps	  to	  weaken	  the	  Sandinistas	  included	  a	  termination	  of	  the	  $15	  million	  balance	  of	  the	  aid	  approved	  by	  Former	  President	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Roy	  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy:	  The	  Making	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Nicaragua,	  1981-­1987	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  1988),	  94.	  34	  Gutman,	  94.	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Carter,	  blocking	  of	  credits	  from	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  turning	  intelligence	  operations	  against	  Sandinistas,	  organizing	  counterrevolutionary	  forces	  (the	  Contras),	  and	  holding	  military	  and	  naval	  exercises	  around	  Nicaragua	  in	  a	  display	  of	  superiority.35	  Prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendments,	  between	  1982	  and	  1984,	  a	  series	  of	  legislative	  initiatives	  in	  which	  Congress	  stopped	  funding	  to	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  enjoyed	  limited	  support	  from	  Congress	  in	  assisting	  with	  humanitarian	  efforts	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Reagan	  shifted	  the	  direction	  of	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua,	  focusing	  on	  military	  aid	  for	  the	  Contras	  rather	  than	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  Carter	  championed.	  As	  historian	  James	  Lebovic	  recognizes:	  [Under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration]	  Arms	  supplies	  were	  once	  again	  viewed	  as	  a	  'regular'	  and	  not	  an	  'exceptional'	  policy	  instrument,	  and	  economic	  assistance	  was	  unapologetically	  offered	  as	  a	  means	  to	  'promote	  political	  stability	  and	  avoid	  the	  movement	  of	  less	  developed	  countries	  towards	  Communism.'	  When	  economic	  development	  itself	  was	  at	  issue,	  US	  economic	  interests	  were	  stressed.	  	  	  These	  legal	  interactions	  with	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua	  created	  the	  impression	  of	  U.S.	  support	  and	  Contra	  dependence.	  While	  Reagan	  still	  maintained	  the	  support	  of	  Congress,	  he	  implemented	  military-­‐oriented	  policies	  geared	  at	  building	  a	  friendly	  regime	  in	  respect	  to	  U.S.	  security	  and	  economic	  policy.	  	   The	  Contras,	  however,	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  idealistic	  freedom	  fighters	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  American	  public.	  In	  the	  Central	  American	  peace	  movement,	  over	  one	  hundred	  thousand	  U.S.	  citizens	  mobilized	  to	  halt	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Central	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Cole	  Blasier,	  The	  Hovering	  Giant:	  US	  Responses	  to	  Revolutionary	  Change	  in	  Latin	  America	  1910-­1985	  (Pittsburgh:	  The	  University	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  Pittsburgh	  Press,	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American	  affairs.36	  Reed	  Brody,	  a	  U.S.	  lawyer,	  voluntarily	  traveled	  to	  Nicaragua	  for	  five	  months	  to	  chronicle	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Contras	  on	  the	  Sandinista	  regime	  and	  Nicaraguan	  people.	  His	  findings,	  which	  were	  described	  in	  detail	  in	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  report,	  shocked	  readers.	  Brody	  described	  a	  multitude	  of	  terrifying	  behavior,	  including	  mass	  rape,	  murder	  of	  innocent	  civilians,	  and	  pillaging	  of	  nearly	  all	  the	  communities	  the	  Contras	  encountered.	  The	  Contras	  left	  very	  few	  survivors	  unharmed	  and	  committed	  various	  human	  rights	  violations.	  In	  one	  account,	  the	  Contras	  ambushed	  a	  truck	  of	  volunteer	  coffee	  pickers.	  They	  proceeded	  to	  slaughter	  twenty-­‐one	  civilians,	  including	  a	  mother	  and	  five-­‐year-­‐old	  child	  that	  had	  simply	  used	  the	  truck	  for	  a	  ride.37	  	  	  The	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  the	  Contras,	  detailed	  in	  multiple	  fact-­‐finding	  missions,	  sparked	  anti-­‐war	  movements	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  Era.	  Citizens	  fought	  against	  government-­‐sponsored	  propaganda	  campaigns	  and	  decentralization.38	  The	  opposition	  movement	  asserted	  that	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  possessed	  a	  “hegemonic	  presumption”	  that	  Latin	  America	  fell	  within	  the	  U.S.	  sphere	  of	  influence.39	  These	  solidarity	  protests	  were	  also	  commonly	  driven	  by	  moral	  outrage,	  religious	  sentiments,	  emotional	  reaction	  to	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  personal	  values.40	  The	  anti-­‐Contra	  movement	  indicated	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  support	  behind	  Reagan’s	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua,	  a	  precursor	  to	  political	  action	  meant	  to	  stop	  the	  U.S.	  funded	  violence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Smith,	  xvi.	  	  37	  Reed	  Brody,	  Contra	  Terror	  in	  Nicaragua	  (Boston:	  South	  End	  Press,	  1985).	  	  38	  Roger	  Peace,	  "Winning	  Hearts	  and	  Minds:	  The	  Debate	  Over	  U.S.	  Intervention	  in	  Nicaragua	  in	  the	  1980s,"	  Peace	  &	  Change,	  35,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  12-­‐13.	  39	  Smith,	  18.	  	  40	  Ibid,	  168.	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Regardless	  of	  these	  protesters,	  which	  numbered	  in	  the	  tens	  of	  thousands,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  continued	  its	  support	  of	  the	  Contras.	  Reagan	  took	  the	  promise	  he	  made	  to	  eradicate	  communism	  to	  the	  American	  people	  seriously	  and	  believed	  that	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  hostile	  communist	  regimes	  he	  had	  to	  continue	  in	  his	  policy	  direction,	  sacrificing	  popularity	  as	  protests	  continued	  and	  became	  more	  aggressive	  to	  maintain,	  in	  his	  belief,	  the	  safety	  of	  American	  citizens	  for	  generations	  to	  come.	  	  	   As	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Contras	  became	  public	  knowledge,	  Congressional	  financial	  support	  dried-­‐up.	  	  In	  1984,	  after	  two	  years	  of	  debate	  and	  discussion,	  Congress	  passed	  a	  series	  of	  legislation	  known	  as	  the	  Boland	  Amendments,	  introduced	  by	  Massachusetts	  Representative	  Democrat	  Edward	  Boland,	  prohibiting	  assistance	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  rebels.	  The	  legislation,	  signed	  on	  October	  12,	  1984,	  recognized	  that:	  	  During	  fiscal	  year	  1985,	  no	  funds	  available	  to	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  or	  any	  other	  agency	  or	  entity	  of	  the	  United	  States	  involved	  in	  intelligence	  activities	  may	  be	  obligated	  or	  expended	  for	  the	  purpose	  or	  which	  would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  supporting,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  military	  or	  paramilitary	  operations	  in	  Nicaragua	  by	  any	  nation,	  group,	  organization,	  movement	  or	  individual.	  	  This	  legislation	  allowed	  for	  the	  President	  to	  request	  funds	  from	  Congress	  again	  after	  February	  28,	  1985,	  providing	  the	  Administration	  needed	  assistance	  for	  “military	  or	  paramilitary	  operations”	  otherwise	  prohibited	  by	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.	  The	  Reagan	  administration,	  therefore,	  could	  receive	  $14	  million	  in	  funds	  following	  1985	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if	  Congress	  passed	  a	  joint	  resolution	  approving	  such	  action.41	  This	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendment	  demonstrates	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  legislation	  to	  stop	  government	  funds	  from	  reaching	  aggressors	  in	  Nicaragua.	  In	  discussions,	  Representative	  Boland	  confirmed	  this	  intention,	  stating	  that	  the	  legislation	  meant	  to	  prohibit	  any	  funds,	  direct	  or	  indirect,	  from	  reaching	  any	  use	  of	  force	  in	  Nicaragua	  opposing	  the	  existing	  government,	  identifying	  no	  exceptions	  to	  that	  prohibition.42	  	  	   The	  effect	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendment,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  would	  certainly	  be	  a	  complete	  Sandinista	  victory	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  Boland	  Amendment	  required	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  get	  creative,	  as	  the	  Administration	  refused	  to	  abandon	  their	  goals	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  sacrifice	  U.S.	  security	  interest.	  Led	  by	  William	  Casey,	  the	  Administration	  and	  CIA	  worked	  to	  divert	  costs	  to	  CIA	  overhead	  and	  payroll	  accounts.	  Reagan	  recognized	  the	  Congressional	  intent	  to	  stop	  all	  Contra	  support,	  but	  believed	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  U.S.	  were	  not	  to	  be	  compromised	  under	  any	  circumstances.	  Although	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  had	  a	  clear	  intention	  of	  stopping	  the	  intervention,	  Reagan	  refused	  to	  allow	  the	  legislation	  to	  interfere	  with	  his	  policy	  objectives.	  	  	   Under	  Reagan’s	  wishes,	  therefore,	  the	  Administration	  began	  to	  search	  for	  a	  loophole	  to	  continue	  the	  intervention	  in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  sought	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  to	  proceed	  with	  covert	  action.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  NSC	  defined	  their	  responsibilities	  as	  separate	  from	  “intelligence	  activities.”	  	  In	  a	  January	  1985	  memorandum,	  the	  CIA	  identified	  two	  organizations,	  the	  State	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  U.S.	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Congressional	  Research	  Service.	  Congressional	  Use	  of	  Funding	  Cutoffs	  Since	  
1970	  Involving	  U.S.	  Military	  Forces	  and	  Overseas	  Deployments	  by	  Richard	  F.	  Grimmett.	  10	  January	  2001.	  <http://www.fas.org/>.	  	  42	  David	  Ryan,	  US-­Sandinista	  Diplomatic	  Relations	  (New	  York:	  St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  Inc,	  1995),	  84.	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Department	  and	  the	  NSC,	  as	  possible	  institutions	  to	  circumvent	  the	  legislation.43	  A	  week	  later,	  in	  a	  memorandum	  sent	  to	  a	  select	  group	  of	  people,	  including	  Oliver	  North,	  the	  CIA	  outlined	  options	  for	  working	  to	  support	  in	  the	  Contras	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Boland	  prohibitions.44	  By	  favoring	  the	  use	  of	  third-­‐party	  countries,	  this	  memorandum	  demonstrates	  the	  disconnected	  nature	  of	  the	  NSC	  as	  a	  non-­‐intelligence	  agency.	  Whereas	  institutions	  like	  the	  CIA	  firmly	  fell	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendment,	  the	  political	  elites	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  both	  in	  his	  cabinet	  and	  in	  other	  intelligence	  institutions,	  employed	  creative	  interpretations	  to	  place	  the	  NSC	  in	  an	  unconstrained	  gray	  area	  as	  a	  pseudo-­‐intelligence/government	  agency.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  informal	  alliance	  between	  the	  NSC,	  CIA,	  State,	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  deliberated	  on	  how,	  through	  an	  exclusion	  of	  the	  intelligence	  agencies,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  could	  continue	  the	  activities	  in	  Nicaragua	  outlawed	  by	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.45	  This	  action	  continued	  the	  thread	  initiated	  in	  1981	  with	  N.S.D.D.	  17	  in	  support	  of	  covert	  action,	  demonstrating	  both	  the	  commitment	  of	  various	  institutions	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  cause	  and	  also	  to	  covert	  action	  as	  an	  acceptable	  foreign	  policy	  tool.	  	  The	  support	  Ronald	  Reagan	  himself	  provided	  for	  this	  policy	  is	  unknown.	  The	  evidence	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  Reagan	  directed	  his	  subordinates	  to	  circumvent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Stanley	  Sporkin	  to	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence.	  “Memorandum,”	  Digital	  National	  Security	  
Archive:	  Iran-­Contra	  Affair	  [Hereafter	  DNSA].	  7	  January	  1985.	  Item	  Number:	  IC00698:	  http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsaindexhome.htm.	  44	  Robert	  McFarlane,	  Top	  Secret,	  Memorandum	  “[With	  Tabs	  -­‐	  "Approve"	  Box	  Initialed	  by	  Robert	  McFarlane].”	  DNSA.	  January	  15,	  1985,	  16	  pp.	  Item	  Number:	  IC00725.	  	  45	  Ibid.	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the	  law.46	  In	  1983,	  he	  explicitly	  ordered	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  to	  act	  as	  a	  support	  system	  and	  cooperate	  with	  the	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  William	  Casey,	  to	  the	  best	  of	  its	  abilities	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  assisting	  the	  Nicaraguan	  resistance	  forces.47	  Reagan’s	  attendance	  at	  important	  meetings,	  including	  one	  in	  1984	  where	  plans	  were	  drawn	  to	  initiate	  third-­‐country	  funding,	  indicates	  his	  support	  and	  involvement	  in	  working	  around	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  to	  continue	  his	  policy	  toward	  Nicaragua.48	  While	  Reagan	  was	  not	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  entire	  plan,	  his	  oversight	  and	  interest	  suggests	  that	  he	  remained	  involved	  in	  guidance,	  but	  not	  as	  an	  organizer,	  throughout	  the	  entire	  Iran	  Contra	  Affair.	  Although	  then-­‐CIA	  Director	  William	  Casey	  died	  shortly	  before	  the	  scandal	  surfaced	  in	  US	  media,	  he	  was	  undoubtedly	  one	  of	  the	  main	  architects	  of	  the	  elaborate	  scheme	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  and	  continue	  providing	  financial	  support	  to	  the	  Contras.	  Casey	  gained	  the	  nickname	  “Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  Countries”	  from	  U.S.	  Diplomats,	  demonstrating	  his	  ability	  and	  ambition	  when	  crossing	  departmental	  lines	  to	  achieve	  his	  policy	  prerogatives.49	  Upon	  recommendation	  from	  CIA	  Deputy	  Director	  for	  Intelligence	  Robert	  Gates,	  Casey	  discussed	  in	  a	  1986	  speech	  that	  consistent	  military	  aggression	  was	  necessary	  to	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  political	  power	  in	  Nicaragua,	  revealing	  his	  opinions	  and	  goals	  for	  the	  Contras.50	  During	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  hearings,	  North	  inadvertently	  revealed	  that	  Casey	  envisioned	  a	  stand-­‐alone,	  offshore	  enterprise	  that	  financed	  itself	  entirely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Schaller,	  151.	  	  47	  Leogrande,	  383.	  	  48	  Leogrande,	  388.	  49	  Gutman,	  314.	  50	  Peace,	  7.	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through	  extra-­‐governmental	  donations	  and	  could	  operate	  covert	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  non-­‐related	  entity,	  effectively	  serving	  as	  a	  financier	  for	  missions	  without	  requiring	  Congressional	  or	  even	  executive	  approval.51	  While	  this	  level	  of	  sophistication	  never	  materialized,	  North’s	  slip	  demonstrated	  the	  closeness	  of	  North	  and	  Casey	  in	  creating	  and	  executing	  the	  complex	  scheme	  that	  ultimately	  came	  to	  fund	  the	  covert	  action	  in	  Nicaragua.	  	  	   The	  second	  key	  player,	  Oliver	  North,	  emerged	  as	  an	  unexpected,	  and	  necessarily	  inconspicuous,	  leader	  for	  the	  Contra	  support	  efforts	  in	  Washington.	  In	  1984,	  Casey	  and	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Robert	  McFarlane	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	  Contras	  and	  McFarlane	  suggested	  his	  favorite	  aide,	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Oliver	  North,	  for	  the	  precarious	  assignment	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  liaison	  between	  the	  NSC	  and	  CIA	  for	  the	  Contra	  funding	  program.52	  North’s	  background	  in	  the	  Marines	  characterized	  his	  approach	  to	  the	  position,	  demonstrated	  by	  his	  complete	  obedience	  to	  superiors,	  especially	  the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.	  In	  early	  1984,	  Robert	  McFarlane	  described	  Reagan’s	  orders	  to	  North	  that	  he	  hold	  the	  Contra	  forces	  together	  “body	  and	  soul”	  when	  Congress	  stripped	  the	  CIA	  of	  funding	  through	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.53	  As	  political	  scientists	  Kyle	  Longley,	  Jeremy	  D.	  Mayer,	  Michael	  Schaller,	  John	  W.	  Sloan	  recognize,	  for	  Reagan,	  “a	  president	  who	  seldom	  issued	  clear	  instructions	  to	  subordinates,	  this	  was	  a	  definitive	  order.”54	  North,	  therefore,	  saw	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Gutman,	  341.	  52	  Leogrande,	  396.	  53	  Leogrande,	  400;	  Gutman,	  313.	  54	  Kyle	  Longley,	  Jeremy	  D.	  Mayer,	  Michael	  Schaller,	  John	  W.	  Sloan,	  Deconstructing	  Reagan:	  
Conservative	  Mythology	  and	  America's	  Fortieth	  President	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  2007),	  27.	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focus	  his	  attention	  on	  the	  singular	  goal	  of	  maintaining	  the	  Contra	  forces	  regardless	  of	  any	  obstacles.	   McFarlane,	  while	  not	  as	  influential	  of	  an	  actor	  as	  North	  or	  Casey,	  remained	  a	  crucial	  and	  interesting	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  actor	  in	  the	  Contra	  schemes.	  His	  connection	  to	  Reagan	  as	  a	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  allowed	  him	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  link	  between	  North,	  Casey,	  and	  Reagan.	  As	  an	  aide	  to	  Henry	  Kissinger	  in	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  McFarlane	  gained	  a	  reputation	  for	  doing	  business	  with	  foreign	  governments	  outside	  of	  regular	  channels.55	  McFarlane’s	  relationship	  with	  North,	  although	  rather	  ordinary,	  allowed	  for	  him	  to	  communicate	  the	  needs	  and	  goals	  of	  Reagan	  without	  involving	  the	  President	  too	  closely	  or	  giving	  North	  too	  much	  formal	  power.	  McFarlane	  was	  not	  an	  architect,	  but	  rather	  a	  necessary	  cog	  in	  the	  wheel	  to	  continue	  Reagan’s	  loose	  involvement	  in	  the	  Contra	  funding	  plan	  and	  provide	  necessary	  information	  and	  instructions	  to	  North	  and	  Casey.	  Consequently,	  Oliver	  North,	  an	  unlikely	  NSC	  mid-­‐level	  bureaucrat,	  became	  the	  champion,	  architect,	  and	  inconspicuous	  leader	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  North	  was	  the	  perfect	  candidate	  for	  Casey’s	  schemes:	  he	  directed	  funding,	  arms	  drops,	  understood	  military	  and	  political	  strategy,	  and	  maintained	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  control	  on	  the	  Contra	  rebels.56	  By	  mid-­‐1985,	  North	  had	  developed	  a	  network	  of	  donors,	  both	  private	  citizens	  and	  third	  party	  countries,	  that	  he	  and	  Casey	  dubbed	  “the	  Enterprise.”57	  North	  operated	  within	  the	  interior	  channels	  of	  the	  NSC,	  continuously	  advised	  by	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  John	  Poindexter,	  McFarlane,	  and	  Casey,	  who	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  James	  Mann,	  The	  Rebellion	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2009),	  83.	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  Gutman,	  314.	  57	  Leogrande,	  402-­‐404.	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provided	  guidance	  and	  support	  while	  North	  assumed	  the	  majority	  of	  responsibility.58	  Prominent	  NSC	  and	  White	  House	  Officials	  lobbied	  relentlessly	  to	  reinstate	  funding	  and	  create	  congressional	  support	  for	  North’s	  directives	  in	  Central	  America,	  but	  their	  continued	  failure	  increased	  the	  pressure	  on	  North	  and	  Casey’s	  activities	  to	  succeed	  and	  provide	  alternative	  support	  for	  the	  Contras.59	  North	  cooperated	  with	  private	  think	  tanks,	  nonprofits,	  and	  lobbying	  groups,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  extensively	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  These	  conservative	  groups	  held	  expensive	  fundraisers	  or	  even	  private	  meetings	  with	  policymakers	  to	  solicit	  contributions	  to	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  North	  would	  then	  funnel	  the	  money	  through	  a	  Swiss	  bank	  account	  to	  weapons	  procurement	  agencies,	  which	  would	  then	  ship	  weapons	  to	  the	  Contras.60	  North’s	  low	  profile	  allowed	  for	  this	  to	  occur	  without	  high-­‐level	  scrutiny,	  keeping	  the	  process	  entirely	  underground	  from	  1985	  until	  late	  1986.	  After	  failing	  to	  repeal	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  in	  1984,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  toughened	  its	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  rhetoric,	  escalating	  the	  pressure	  on	  North	  to	  increase	  domestic	  support.	  As	  a	  result,	  Casey	  assisted	  North	  in	  implementing	  an	  aggressive	  propaganda	  campaign,	  flooding	  major	  news	  U.S.	  outlets	  with	  fabricated	  information	  on	  Sandinista	  activities,	  including	  accusations	  that	  anti-­‐Contra	  journalists	  were	  engaging	  in	  illicit	  behavior.61	  This	  campaign,	  especially	  once	  major	  media	  began	  to	  understand	  the	  real	  actions	  of	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  surrounding	  states,	  elicited	  enraged	  responses	  from	  critics	  of	  the	  administration	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  Oliver	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  to	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and	  members	  of	  the	  Central	  America	  peace	  and	  solidarity	  movements.	  A	  prominent	  example	  was	  Eldon	  Kenworthy,	  a	  Cornell	  University	  professor	  during	  the	  Reagan	  era,	  who	  wrote	  scathing	  scholarly	  articles	  in	  prominent	  journals,	  accusing	  Reagan	  of	  distorting	  facts,	  lying	  to	  the	  American	  people,	  and	  exploiting	  national	  fears	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  misguided	  policies,	  demonstrating	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  and	  even	  open	  criticism	  academics	  and	  experts	  publicly	  articulated.62	  Conversely,	  Robert	  Parry	  and	  Peter	  Kornbluh	  recognized	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  administration’s	  sophisticated	  informational	  war	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  neutralize	  post-­‐Vietnam	  sentiments.63	  Around	  times	  of	  crisis	  or	  war,	  the	  population	  of	  the	  US	  tends	  to	  increase	  its	  general	  support	  for	  political	  leaders	  and	  the	  nation’s	  foreign	  policy.	  This	  social	  phenomenon,	  referred	  to	  as	  “rallying	  around	  the	  flag,”	  did	  not	  apply	  for	  the	  Contras.	  Political	  scientist	  Gordon	  Bowen,	  in	  an	  article	  analyzing	  this	  broad	  phenomenon,	  cited	  the	  Contras	  between	  1983-­‐1989	  as	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  typical	  American	  political	  response.64	  The	  informational	  campaigns	  orchestrated	  by	  Casey	  and	  North,	  although	  fascinating	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  merely	  serve	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  unshakable	  statistical	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause,	  illustrating	  both	  the	  pressure	  placed	  on	  North	  to	  continue	  his	  mission	  by	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  questionable	  importance	  of	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  Reagan	  administration.	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Consequently,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  prior	  to	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal,	  which	  started	  to	  leak	  in	  late	  1986,	  remained	  adamantly	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Contras.	  Resisting	  congressional	  and	  public	  pushback,	  the	  NSC	  and	  CIA	  worked	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  to	  continue	  funding	  to	  the	  Contras	  with	  the	  larger	  goal	  of	  eradicating	  communist	  regimes	  in	  neighboring	  Latin	  America.	  Oliver	  North	  emerged	  as	  a	  prominent	  figure	  in	  gaining	  Contra	  support	  and	  working	  within	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  continue	  Reagan’s	  goal	  of	  eliminating	  the	  leftist	  Sandinista	  regime,	  demonstrating	  the	  insignificance	  of	  his	  mid-­‐level	  status	  in	  creating	  and	  implementing	  real	  political	  change	  and	  policy.	  Through	  a	  creative	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendments,	  the	  NSC	  sought	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  the	  traditional	  policy	  channels	  and	  find	  funding	  to	  continue	  supporting	  the	  Contra	  cause.	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Chapter	  2:	  Non-­State	  Contributions	  	   In	  1984,	  Mrs.	  Ellen	  Garwood	  was	  a	  co-­‐signatory	  on	  a	  letter	  written	  by	  Spitz	  Channell,	  a	  political	  organizer,	  on	  behalf	  on	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Trust	  to	  President	  Reagan.	  This	  letter	  applauded	  Reagan’s	  policies	  in	  Central	  America,	  specifically	  toward	  Nicaragua,	  and	  emphasized	  the	  growing	  threat	  to	  American	  security	  represented	  by	  the	  Sandinista	  regime.65	  Garwood,	  a	  wealthy	  Texas	  widow,	  chose	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  cause	  as	  her	  charity	  of	  choice.	  The	  following	  year,	  through	  General	  Singlaub,	  another	  political	  organizer,	  a	  large	  donation	  from	  Garwood	  allowed	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  medical	  evacuation	  helicopter	  for	  the	  Contras	  that	  was	  named	  “Lady	  Ellen.”	  In	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  discussing	  the	  helicopter,	  Garwood	  disclosed	  that	  she	  spent	  the	  majority	  of	  her	  time	  networking	  with	  individuals,	  contributing	  to	  the	  Contra	  cause,	  and	  writing	  letters	  to	  encourage	  other	  Texans	  to	  support	  the	  freedom	  fighters	  in	  Nicaragua.66	  	  In	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  Contra	  funding,	  North,	  Channell,	  and	  donors	  like	  Ellen	  Garwood	  remained	  closely	  connected,	  using	  their	  different	  strengths	  to	  compensate	  for	  any	  financial	  or	  legal	  obstacles	  the	  Contras	  may	  have	  faced.	  In	  this	  political	  moment,	  ordinary	  individuals	  like	  Mrs.	  Ellen	  Garwood	  became	  political	  actors	  influenced	  by	  the	  state	  and	  in	  turn	  influencing	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  state.	  Just	  a	  week	  later,	  Garwood	  donated	  another	  $75,000	  to	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  the	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  Carl	  Channell	  and	  Ellen	  Garwood	  to	  President	  Reagan.	  Non-­‐Classified	  Letter.	  “Letter	  Urging	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  Consider	  an	  Extended	  Program	  of	  Education	  for	  American	  Public	  on	  Central	  America.”	  DNSA.	  9	  May	  1984.	  Item	  Number:	  IC00424.	  66	  New	  York	  Times	  Article.	  “A	  Copter	  Called	  Lady	  Ellen.”	  DNSA.	  13	  August	  1985.	  Item	  Number:	  IC01418.	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Preservation	  of	  Liberty,	  a	  tax-­‐exempt	  fundraising	  organization	  run	  by	  Channell.67	  At	  10:30	  that	  same	  day,	  Garwood	  appeared	  in	  Oliver	  North’s	  personal	  schedule	  for	  a	  meeting	  undoubtedly	  regarding	  her	  financial	  contributions	  and	  commitments.68	  The	  day	  prior,	  North	  had	  met	  with	  Channell	  to	  presumably	  discuss	  the	  same.	  	  Between	  1983	  and	  1987,	  donors	  like	  Garwood	  proved	  instrumental	  to	  maintaining	  the	  Contra	  fighters	  in	  Nicaragua.	  These	  donors	  organized	  supporters	  on	  a	  grassroots	  level	  through	  public	  interest	  meetings	  and	  networking,	  met	  with	  other	  wealthy	  and	  influential	  people	  in	  their	  area,	  and	  acted	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  conservative	  lobbying	  groups.	  Channell	  courted	  various	  wealthy	  widows	  similar	  to	  Garwood,	  entertaining	  and	  flattering	  them	  in	  the	  context	  of	  asking	  for	  donations	  to	  his	  organizations	  (then	  privately	  mocking	  them	  as	  “the	  blue	  rinse	  brigade).”69	  Of	  the	  money	  Channell	  raised	  from	  private	  donors,	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  went	  to	  tours	  of	  swing-­‐districts	  by	  Contra	  leaders,	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  advertising,	  lobbying	  in	  Washington,	  and	  attack	  campaigns	  designed	  to	  unseat	  anti-­‐Contra	  congressional	  leaders,	  while	  the	  rest	  went	  to	  the	  salaries	  of	  organizers	  and	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  the	  political	  network.70	  Donors	  could	  also	  opt	  to	  buy	  arms,	  like	  planes,	  directly.	  This	  private	  fundraising,	  combined	  with	  state-­‐orchestrated	  efforts	  by	  Oliver	  North,	  created	  a	  loosely	  united,	  yet	  still	  formidable,	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  force	  within	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  and	  in	  the	  non-­‐state	  arena.	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  Check.	  “Check	  for	  $75,000	  from	  Ellen	  Garwood	  to	  NEPL	  for	  Contra	  Arms.”	  DNSA.	  23	  August	  1985.	  Item	  Number:	  IC01459.	  68	  Oliver	  North.	  Calendar	  Entry.	  “North	  Calendar	  for	  August	  23,	  1985.”	  DNSA.	  23	  August	  1985.	  Item	  Number:	  IC01464.	  69	  Smith,	  276.	  70	  Smith,	  277.	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   In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  machinery	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  worked	  to	  create	  channels	  within	  the	  state	  to	  continue	  funding	  of	  the	  Contras	  and	  solicit	  non-­‐governmental	  funds,	  actors	  outside	  the	  state	  also	  saw	  continued	  support	  of	  the	  Contra	  fighters	  as	  necessary	  to	  U.S.	  security	  interests.	  North	  assumed	  the	  lead	  on	  this	  plan,	  fulfilling	  his	  promise	  to	  Reagan	  to	  keep	  the	  Contras	  together	  “body	  and	  soul”	  through	  a	  series	  of	  elaborate	  relationships	  with	  lobbying	  groups	  and	  well-­‐connected	  private	  individuals.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  analyze	  how	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  understood	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  toward	  the	  Contras	  and	  also	  how	  they	  shaped	  the	  Administration’s	  foreign	  policy.	  North’s	  position	  allowed	  him	  to	  forge	  inconspicuous	  business	  and	  political	  relationships	  with	  non-­‐state	  institutions	  and	  organizations,	  which	  is	  significant	  because	  he	  remained	  an	  important	  actor	  while	  avoiding	  the	  spotlight	  in	  the	  media.	  I	  also	  discuss	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  on	  a	  personal	  level	  in	  depth,	  exploring	  individuals	  like	  Channell,	  a	  political	  organizer,	  and	  prominent	  private	  donors	  like	  Garwood,	  and	  I	  analyze	  the	  involvement	  of	  these	  donors	  with	  both	  the	  non-­‐state	  political	  organizations	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  	  These	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  significant	  due	  to	  their	  unprecedented	  involvement	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  creation	  and	  implementation	  process.	  Finally,	  I	  illustrate	  how	  donations	  were	  procured	  and	  where	  they	  were	  spent	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  promote	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  	  	   Although	  private	  U.S.	  citizen	  donations	  alone	  did	  not	  completely	  sustain	  the	  Contras,	  their	  use	  and	  solicitation	  did	  indicate	  a	  new	  element	  of	  policy	  formation.	  During	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  trials	  in	  1989,	  the	  funds	  obtained	  from	  arms	  sales	  to	  Iran	  
31	  
and	  private	  donations	  gained	  most	  of	  the	  attention.	  The	  lifeblood	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause,	  however,	  was	  financed	  through	  contributions	  from	  third	  party	  countries.	  This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  donations	  from	  private	  individuals	  to	  further	  explore	  the	  formation	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  these	  private	  donations	  were	  not	  solely	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  the	  Contra	  fighters	  and	  providing	  them	  with	  weapons.71	  In	  total,	  from	  fiscal	  years	  1982	  through	  1990,	  when	  the	  Sandinistas	  lost	  in	  a	  democratic	  election	  to	  a	  U.S.-­‐sponsored	  leader,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  appropriated	  $322	  million	  for	  Contra	  aid,	  with	  $142	  million	  for	  military	  use	  and	  $179	  million	  for	  nonmilitary	  purposes.72	  Compared	  to	  these	  large	  government	  contributions,	  which	  were	  suspended	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  by	  the	  Boland	  Amendments,	  private	  donors	  contributed	  $10	  million	  for	  Contra	  aid.73	  As	  political	  scientist	  Richard	  Sobel	  recognizes,	  “private	  contributions	  from	  Americans	  and	  profits	  from	  arms	  sales	  to	  Iran	  received	  major	  publicity,	  only	  contributions	  from	  third	  countries	  were	  significant	  in	  helping	  to	  sustain	  the	  Contras	  financially	  when	  US	  government	  funding	  was	  unavailable.”74	  The	  donations	  from	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  historically	  significant,	  however,	  due	  to	  the	  unprecedented	  involvement	  of	  private	  U.S.	  citizens	  in	  a	  political	  action	  that	  directly	  drove	  the	  formation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  These	  contributions	  demonstrate,	  as	  political	  scientist	  James	  M.	  Scott	  argues,	  that	  “treating	  foreign	  policy	  as	  the	  exclusive	  province	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  a	  narrow	  focus	  that	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  complexity	  that	  flows	  from	  the	  constitutional	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  See	  Sobel,	  Richard.	  "Contra	  Aid	  Fundamentals:	  Exploring	  the	  Intricacies	  and	  the	  Issues."	  Political	  
Science	  Quarterly.	  110.	  no.	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  (1995):	  287-­‐288.	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  Sobel,	  288.	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  Sobel,	  290.	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  Sobel,	  288.	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ambiguity,	  that	  is	  manifested	  in	  US	  history,	  and	  that	  ignores	  important	  features	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  making.”75	  Non-­‐state	  actors	  became	  a	  part	  of	  the	  institutionalized	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  complicating	  the	  policy	  formation	  process	  by	  adding	  a	  previously	  unseen	  driving	  force.	  While,	  in	  numerical	  percentage,	  their	  influence	  may	  appear	  small,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  this	  non-­‐state	  involvement	  in	  policy	  formation	  remains	  significant	  because	  it	  establishes	  a	  channel	  for	  contribution,	  financially	  and	  politically,	  and	  creates	  a	  previously	  nonexistent	  mechanism	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  	  	   Although	  these	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Liberty	  and	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Trust,	  among	  others,	  were	  pressuring	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  specific	  policies,	  they	  also	  grew	  due	  to	  Reagan	  Administration	  rhetoric	  and	  ideology.	  To	  generate	  support	  for	  these	  organizations,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  assisted	  in	  promoting	  their	  causes	  and	  goals.	  On	  April	  20,	  1985	  the	  President	  issued	  a	  radio	  broadcast	  that	  claimed	  the	  Sandinistas	  were	  lobbying	  U.S.	  representatives	  and	  senators	  to	  deny	  aid	  to	  the	  Contras.	  He	  called	  upon	  the	  American	  people,	  asking	  them	  to	  see	  through	  the	  campaign	  of	  “distortion	  and	  lies”	  the	  Sandinistas	  were	  running.	  In	  support,	  the	  Washington	  Times	  published	  a	  five-­‐part	  series	  identifying	  a	  network	  of	  hundreds	  of	  leftist	  groups,	  organizations,	  individual	  supporters,	  and	  politicians	  lobbying	  against	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  the	  Contras	  to	  support	  the	  communist	  Sandinistas.76	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  recognized	  these	  leftist	  orchestrators	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	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  Scott,	  238.	  76	  Sidney	  Blumenthal,	  "Dateline	  Washington:	  The	  Conservative	  Crackup,"	  Foreign	  Policy,	  no.	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agenda	  of	  democracy	  and	  consequently	  identified	  and	  supported	  similar	  organizations	  on	  the	  conservative	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  While	  members	  of	  the	  left	  tried	  desperately	  to	  maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  legislation	  to	  prevent	  the	  right	  from	  continuing	  to	  support	  the	  Contras,	  conservatives	  refused	  to	  desist.	  On	  both	  sides,	  social	  activists	  mobilized	  to	  campaign	  for	  their	  respective	  political	  goals,	  but	  conservative	  organizations	  became	  essential	  to	  the	  cultivation	  and	  growth	  of	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  network	  of	  donors	  who	  contributed	  financially	  to	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  	  	   The	  Reagan	  Administration	  also	  employed	  traditional	  advertising	  techniques	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  his	  Contra	  policy.	  Reagan’s	  rhetoric	  highlighted	  the	  deepest	  fears	  of	  the	  New	  Right,	  linking	  Soviet	  expansionism,	  terrorism,	  and	  international	  drug	  trafficking	  to	  the	  Contras	  in	  Central	  America.77	  Casey	  and	  North,	  along	  with	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  Elliot	  Abrams	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  worked	  with	  professionals	  in	  advertising,	  public	  relations,	  and	  marketing	  to	  increase	  public	  support,	  both	  politically	  and	  financially,	  for	  the	  Contra	  fighters.78	  This	  advertising	  scheme	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  White	  House,	  but	  found	  cooperative	  political	  organizers	  in	  the	  non-­‐state	  realm	  to	  orchestrate	  the	  details.	  The	  advertising	  approach	  demonstrates	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  mobilize	  private	  citizens	  and	  increase	  their	  awareness	  of	  the	  Contras	  and	  the	  military	  support	  necessary	  to	  salvage	  the	  situation	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Moreover,	  through	  this	  organized,	  coherent	  effort,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  quietly	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  solicitation	  of	  monetary	  contributions	  from	  private	  individuals.	  More	  than	  just	  basic	  political	  support,	  the	  advertising	  tools	  employed	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	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allowed	  for	  a	  foundation	  of	  non-­‐state	  support	  necessary	  for	  North	  and	  Channell,	  among	  others,	  to	  orchestrate	  their	  elaborate	  plan	  to	  gain	  donors	  and	  financial	  support.	  	  	   Privately,	  numerous	  political	  organizations	  worked	  to	  mobilize	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  cause.	  Encouraged	  by	  the	  President	  through	  policy	  and	  rhetoric,	  established	  conservative	  organizations	  like	  The	  Christian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  the	  Unification	  Church,	  and	  Veterans	  of	  Foreign	  Wars,	  along	  with	  new	  Contra-­‐specific	  organizations	  like	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Patriotic	  Association,	  Citizens	  for	  America,	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Freedom	  Fund,	  and	  Refugee	  Relief	  International	  engaged	  in	  aid	  they	  claimed	  was	  purely	  humanitarian	  in	  nature	  to	  avoid	  violating	  the	  Neutrality	  Act.79	  By	  1984,	  the	  President	  was	  personally	  engaged	  in	  soliciting	  funds,	  meeting	  donors	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  and	  at	  events	  to	  thank	  them.	  Before	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal	  erupted,	  in	  May	  of	  1987,	  the	  President	  even	  claimed	  the	  fundraising	  of	  private	  humanitarian	  donors	  was	  his	  idea.80	  This	  humanitarian	  aid,	  however,	  did	  not	  improve	  the	  human	  rights	  record	  of	  the	  Contras.	  Instead,	  by	  aiding	  Contras	  and	  classifying	  their	  families	  as	  refugees,	  these	  organizations	  provided	  more	  funding	  for	  the	  Contras	  to	  spend	  on	  weapons.81	  	  In	  September	  of	  1984,	  State	  Department	  and	  CIA	  officials	  adamantly	  told	  the	  Senate	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Intelligence	  that	  there	  was	  no	  U.S.	  government	  involvement	  or	  sponsorship	  for	  private	  political	  organizations	  providing	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humanitarian	  aid.82	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  NSC	  briefed	  Contra	  supporters	  in	  specific	  organizations	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Fuerza	  Democrática	  Nicaragüense	  (Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Force	  (FDN)),	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  Contra	  fighters,	  provided	  transportation	  for	  goods	  to	  camps	  in	  Honduras,	  and	  facilitated	  contact	  between	  private	  individuals	  and	  Contra	  leaders.	  Additionally,	  the	  CIA	  assisted	  in	  dividing	  the	  proceeds	  from	  fundraising	  to	  different	  Contra	  factions.83	  This	  example	  demonstrates	  the	  covert	  activity	  of	  the	  CIA	  and	  NSC.	  By	  exploiting	  political	  loopholes	  in	  legislation	  and	  boundaries	  of	  authority,	  the	  institutions	  created	  a	  united	  front	  designed	  to	  further	  an	  unpopular	  and	  illegal	  policy	  while	  maintaining	  secrecy.	  If	  Oliver	  North	  worked	  as	  the	  main	  actor	  in	  this	  process	  from	  the	  governmental	  side,	  Channell	  acted	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  organizers	  for	  the	  civilians	  involved	  in	  supporting	  the	  Contras	  on	  the	  non-­‐state	  side.	  Channell	  served	  in	  the	  military	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  following	  his	  return	  became	  deeply	  involved	  in	  the	  New	  Right	  opposition	  to	  Vietnam	  Anti-­‐War	  protests.	  Prior	  to	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  Contra	  cause,	  he	  maintained	  a	  low-­‐profile	  except	  among	  Washington	  insiders.84	  A	  fund-­‐raiser	  by	  profession,	  Spitz	  Channell	  operated	  and	  managed	  multiple	  right-­‐wing	  letterhead	  organizations	  including	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Liberty	  (NEPL),	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Trust,	  and	  National	  Conservative	  Political	  Action	  Committee.	  Using	  his	  contacts	  in	  Washington	  and	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strong	  support	  from	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  Channell	  acted	  as	  a	  key	  component	  in	  a	  network	  of	  private	  citizens	  generating	  funds	  for	  the	  Contras.	  	  Channell’s	  primary	  organization,	  the	  NEPL,	  hosted	  fundraisers	  and	  worked	  directly	  with	  officials,	  such	  as	  North,	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  The	  NEPL	  described	  itself	  as	  a	  nonpartisan,	  tax-­‐exempt	  nonprofit	  foundation.	  In	  its	  articles	  of	  incorporation,	  the	  NEPL	  claimed	  it	  worked	  towards	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  evolution	  and	  progress	  of	  the	  American	  political	  system	  for	  purely	  educational	  reasons.85	  Founded	  under	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  Nonprofit	  Corporation	  Act	  and	  operating	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  Section	  501(c)(3)	  of	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Code,	  contributions	  to	  the	  NEPL	  were	  tax	  deductible.86	  Under	  these	  classifications,	  when	  donors	  made	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  NEPL,	  which	  could	  buy	  a	  plane,	  supplies,	  or	  military	  hardware	  for	  the	  Contras,	  they	  could	  deduct	  it	  as	  a	  charitable	  donation.	  This	  special	  status	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  since	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  delicate,	  complex,	  and	  malleable	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state.	  The	  state	  recognized	  the	  NELP	  as	  tax-­‐exempt;	  non-­‐state	  individuals	  thus	  received	  a	  financial	  reward	  for	  monetary	  contributions	  to	  an	  agency	  that	  then	  passed	  those	  contributions	  on	  to	  illegal	  state-­‐sponsored	  activities.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  state	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  gray	  area	  where	  individuals	  could	  use	  loopholes	  within	  the	  law	  to	  donate	  directly	  to	  a	  right-­‐wing	  cause,	  despite	  Congressional	  barriers.	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In	  1985,	  the	  NEPL	  began	  soliciting	  donors	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  Solicitation	  letters	  called	  upon	  individuals	  to	  help	  President	  Reagan	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  thwart	  the	  communists	  destabilizing	  the	  Central	  American	  region.	  In	  the	  letter,	  Channell	  relayed	  that	  Reagan	  viewed	  “the	  Nicaragua	  situation	  [as]	  a	  keg	  of	  dynamite	  ready	  to	  explode”	  and	  noted	  the	  President	  is	  “extremely	  worried	  about	  the	  tremendous	  refugee	  problem…created	  by	  the	  Nicaraguan	  tyranny.”	  87	  One	  of	  the	  solicited	  individuals,	  James	  D.	  Dannenbaum,	  wrote	  directly	  to	  Vice	  President	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  requesting	  confirmation	  that	  the	  NEPL	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  administration.	  In	  his	  letter,	  Dannenbaum	  revealed	  that	  Vice	  President	  Bush	  had	  previously	  discussed	  with	  him	  the	  NEPL	  and	  its	  upcoming	  requests	  for	  funding.88	  Dannenbaum	  also	  praised	  the	  Vice	  President	  for	  the	  Administration’s	  continued	  pursuit	  of	  freedom	  worldwide.	  While,	  in	  his	  response,	  Vice	  President	  Bush	  refused	  to	  link	  the	  Administration	  and	  the	  NEPL,	  he	  did	  vouch	  for	  the	  character	  of	  NEPL	  founder	  Channell,	  citing	  him	  as	  an	  organizer	  of	  an	  event	  in	  which	  the	  President	  had	  recently	  spoken,	  noting	  Reagan’s	  “appearance	  at	  the	  fund	  raising	  dinner	  affirmed	  our	  support	  for	  this	  cause.”89	  	  From	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  NEPL,	  the	  organization	  shared	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  due	  to	  the	  political	  connections	  of	  Channell	  and	  the	  Administration’s	  need	  to	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  For	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donors	  who	  contributed	  over	  $300,000	  dollars,	  Channell	  would	  promise	  an	  arranged	  meeting	  with	  the	  President,	  demonstrating	  both	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  ties	  between	  Channell	  and	  Reagan	  as	  individuals.90	  His	  solicitations	  promised	  potential	  donors	  that	  “support	  for	  victims	  of	  tyranny	  [in	  Nicaragua]	  will	  strengthen	  the	  President’s	  strategy…[showing]	  all	  governments	  the	  grass	  roots	  of	  America	  support	  his	  policy.”91	  Channell	  assured	  donors	  he	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  President	  in	  implementing	  policy	  although	  he	  remained	  a	  private	  citizen	  with	  no	  true	  governmental	  role.	  	  During	  this	  time,	  Channell	  also	  built	  a	  relationship	  with	  officials	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  In	  1984,	  he	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Reagan	  on	  American	  Conservative	  Trust	  (ACT)	  letterhead	  demanding	  the	  President	  to	  be	  more	  proactive	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  recognize	  the	  value	  of	  political	  organizations,	  like	  the	  ACT,	  in	  networking	  and	  talking	  with	  concerned	  citizens	  nationwide.92	  This	  letter	  demonstrates	  the	  outward	  show	  of	  closeness	  to	  Reagan	  but	  the	  actual	  disconnect	  between	  the	  organizations	  and	  the	  President.	  This	  changed	  by	  1985,	  as	  Channell’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Administration	  clearly	  evolved	  when	  Oliver	  North	  personally	  wrote	  him	  a	  thank	  you	  note	  for	  his	  generous	  support,	  education	  efforts,	  and	  partnership	  with	  the	  Administration.	  North	  praised	  Channell	  as	  a	  person	  that	  “carried	  this	  great	  burden	  with	  dedication	  and	  a	  true	  sense	  of	  patriotism,”	  recognizing	  that	  “[Channell’s]	  resources	  helped	  carry	  the	  day…to	  save	  freedom	  from	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  “Fundraising	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  the	  Contras,”	  Item	  Number:	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  92	  American	  Conservative	  Trust	  to	  President	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extinction	  in	  Nicaragua.”93	  The	  evolution	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  the	  growing	  connection	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  process,	  but	  also	  an	  emerging	  gray	  area	  in	  the	  duties	  of	  citizens	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  policy.	  Contra	  policies	  may	  have	  been	  misguided	  or	  poorly	  supported	  by	  the	  general	  American	  public,	  but	  private,	  well	  connected	  political	  individuals	  like	  Channell	  allowed	  for	  North’s	  rise	  to	  power	  and	  continued	  funding	  of	  the	  Contras	  without	  Congressional	  support.	  The	  NEPL	  simultaneously	  solicited	  funds,	  networked	  with	  key	  conservative	  political	  leaders,	  and	  lobbied	  in	  Congress,	  acting	  outside	  their	  legal	  boundaries	  and	  creating	  waves	  in	  the	  political	  community.	  By	  the	  final	  month	  of	  1985,	  Channell	  had	  received	  advertising	  proposals	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  NEPL	  from	  large	  agencies	  like	  Robert	  Goodman.	  The	  proposal	  articulated	  a	  strategy	  in	  which	  the	  organization	  would	  purchase	  national	  television	  time	  to	  gain	  congressional	  funding	  and	  target	  possible	  swing	  voters	  in	  regards	  to	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  Contras.94	  As	  a	  tax-­‐exempt	  organization,	  however,	  the	  NEPL	  was	  prohibited	  from	  lobbying	  activities.	  Regardless,	  the	  NEPL	  sponsored	  continuous	  political	  advertisements	  entitled	  “Freedom	  Fighters	  TV.”	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  internal	  papers	  reveal	  that	  NEPL	  officials	  were	  sending	  thank	  you	  letters	  to	  various	  influential	  politicians,	  like	  White	  House	  Communications	  Director	  Pat	  Buchanan,	  and	  also	  soliciting	  multiple	  individuals	  for	  sums	  over	  $20,000	  per	  person.95	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  American	  Conservative	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  “Freedom	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This	  behavior	  continued	  through	  1986.	  In	  February,	  the	  NEPL	  held	  a	  press	  conference	  to	  announce	  a	  new	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  campaign	  entitled	  Central	  American	  Freedom	  Program	  (CAFP)	  designed	  to	  lobby	  in	  congress	  and	  increase	  education	  and	  awareness	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause	  among	  the	  American	  people.	  Operating	  in	  three	  parts:	  congressional	  lobbying,	  mass	  media,	  and	  grassroots	  mobilization,	  these	  efforts	  were	  meant	  to	  ensure	  that	  funds	  continued	  to	  flow	  to	  the	  Contras.96	  Additionally,	  in	  the	  preparation	  and	  advertising	  of	  the	  CAFP,	  Channell’s	  organizations	  identified	  the	  “misinformation”	  of	  pro-­‐Sandinista	  activist	  groups	  as	  an	  enemy	  in	  the	  fight	  to	  support	  freedom	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  Nicaragua.97	  Publicly,	  Channell’s	  organizations	  like	  the	  NEPL	  and	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Trust	  worked	  to	  educate	  the	  American	  people	  about	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  Contras.	  Secretly,	  however,	  these	  organizations	  worked	  to	  tangibly	  further	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  through	  closely	  involving	  political	  advisors	  to	  develop	  programs,	  not	  just	  promote	  the	  policy	  in	  the	  media.	  Early	  1986	  documents,	  including	  letters,	  personal	  calendars,	  and	  other	  means	  of	  correspondence,	  reveal	  that	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Trust	  (ACT)	  and	  NEPL	  were	  working	  closely	  with	  Oliver	  North	  and	  the	  NSC.	  In	  the	  release	  of	  the	  CAFP,	  the	  NEPL	  enlisted	  Reagan	  Administration	  insiders	  to	  promote	  the	  program	  to	  the	  public,	  giving	  the	  illusion	  of	  official	  government	  support	  to	  NEPL	  activities.	  The	  NEPL	  developed	  the	  CAFP	  to	  gain	  donors,	  but	  state	  officials	  within	  the	  Administration	  provided	  necessary	  support	  to	  transform	  the	  campaign	  into	  a	  mobilizing	  tool	  for	  the	  American	  public,	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  Ibid.	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using	  White	  House	  intelligence	  and	  connections	  to	  elevate	  the	  status	  of	  the	  report.	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Don	  Regan,	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Admiral	  John	  Poindexter,	  Oliver	  North,	  and	  Assistant	  Secretary	  Elliot	  Abrams	  joined	  NEPL-­‐sponsored	  programming	  for	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  CAFP.98	  In	  1985	  alone,	  the	  NEPL	  and	  ACT	  spent	  over	  three	  million	  dollars	  supporting	  Reagan	  Administration	  programs	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  in	  return	  the	  Administration	  recognized	  and	  legitimized	  the	  conservative	  political	  organizations.99	  By	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  CAFP,	  the	  state	  had	  closely	  intertwined	  with	  non-­‐state	  political	  organizations,	  creating	  a	  gray	  area	  in	  which	  private	  individuals	  gained	  insight	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  realm.	  	  Another	  key	  organizer	  was	  retired	  Major	  General	  Singlaub.	  Singlaub	  worked	  through	  the	  U.S.	  Council	  for	  World	  Freedom	  (USCWF),	  an	  organization	  created	  in	  1981	  to	  assist	  “freedom	  fighters	  around	  the	  world.”100	  The	  USCWF	  provided	  food,	  boats,	  and	  helicopters	  for	  medical	  use	  after	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  and	  discontinued	  government	  aid	  to	  the	  Contras.	  Using	  the	  humanitarian	  loophole	  to	  assist	  the	  Contras,	  Singlaub	  advertised	  that	  he	  received	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  the	  Pentagon,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State.	  Reagan	  himself	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  organization,	  commending	  the	  USCWF	  and	  World	  Anti-­‐Communist	  League	  on	  their	  support	  for	  the	  noble	  cause	  of	  the	  Contras.101	  	  Singlaub	  chaired	  the	  Council	  for	  National	  Policy,	  another	  conservative	  activist	  group,	  and	  solicited	  wealthy	  individuals	  like	  beer	  mogul	  Joseph	  Coors,	  oil	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  Ibid.	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executive	  Nelson	  Baker	  Hunt,	  singer	  Wayne	  Newton,	  comedian	  Bob	  Hope,	  and	  football	  player	  Roger	  Staubach	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  Contra	  humanitarian	  cause.	  Employing	  New	  Right	  morality	  rhetoric,	  they	  appealed	  to	  the	  sensitive	  side	  of	  conservative	  donors	  to	  protect	  innocent	  democracy	  advocates	  in	  Nicaragua	  from	  the	  communist	  terror	  of	  the	  Sandinistas.	  One	  dinner	  hosted	  by	  Singlaub	  in	  1985,	  long	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  in	  1982,	  where	  President	  Reagan	  gave	  the	  keynote	  speech,	  raised	  upwards	  of	  two	  hundred	  thousand	  dollars.102	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  used	  individuals	  like	  Singlaub	  and	  Channell	  with	  wealthy	  conservative	  political	  networks	  to	  gain	  support	  and	  funding	  from	  private	  citizens	  to	  assist	  the	  Contras	  in	  defeating	  the	  Sandinista	  regime.	  	  	  Singlaub’s	  involvement	  with	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  the	  Contras	  differed	  from	  Channell’s	  political	  organizing	  approach.	  Singlaub	  worked	  within	  the	  USCWF	  and	  also	  represented	  GeoMiliTech	  Consultants	  Corporation	  (GMT),	  an	  arms	  brokerage	  run	  by	  conservative	  talk	  show	  host	  Barbara	  Studley	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  advising	  and	  facilitating	  supplies	  of	  military,	  industrial,	  and	  agricultural	  products	  worldwide.	  GMT	  politically	  advocated	  free	  trade	  and	  strong	  national	  defense,	  so	  the	  corporation	  fit	  neatly	  into	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  in	  Nicaragua.103	  Singlaub,	  through	  GMT,	  submitted	  a	  plan	  to	  the	  CIA	  in	  1985	  to	  arm	  freedom	  fighters	  around	  the	  world	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  or	  Congress	  by	  creating	  a	  three-­‐way	  trade	  network	  with	  China,	  Israel,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  As	  a	  “neutral	  foreign	  trading	  company,”	  GMT	  could	  act	  as	  the	  middleman	  in	  this	  complex	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  Ibid,	  80.	  103	  GeoMiliTech	  Consultants	  Corporation.	  Miscellaneous	  Document	  Type.	  “GeoMiliTech	  Consultants	  Corporation	  Precis.”	  DNSA.	  January	  1985	  [?].	  Item	  Number:	  IC00678.	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arrangement	  to	  provide	  the	  Contras	  with	  funding	  and	  arms	  without	  approval	  from	  traditional	  foreign	  policy	  channels.104	  Although	  this	  proposal	  never	  came	  to	  fruition,	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  connection	  between	  Singlaub,	  the	  USCWF,	  North,	  and	  the	  CIA.	  Like	  Channell,	  Singlaub	  used	  his	  extensive	  political	  network	  to	  alter	  the	  foreign	  policy	  process	  through	  networking	  and	  lobbying	  influential	  political	  figures.	  North’s	  relationship	  with	  Singlaub,	  which	  he	  later	  denied,	  is	  recorded	  in	  North’s	  to-­‐do	  lists,	  personal	  journal	  entries,	  and	  notes.105	  The	  evolution	  and	  growth	  of	  an	  intertwined	  political	  network,	  while	  operating	  nearly	  entirely	  outside	  legislative	  channels	  led	  by	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  worked	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  .	  Congress,	  which	  constitutionally	  holds	  the	  power	  of	  the	  purse	  strings,	  stopped	  financial	  aid	  in	  1982.	  Instead	  of	  abiding	  by	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  legislation,	  intelligence	  and	  National	  Security	  officials	  cooperated	  to	  form	  a	  network	  of	  state	  and	  private	  actors	  to	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  necessary	  foreign	  policy	  intervention	  in	  Nicaragua.	  	  Channell	  and	  Singlaub	  worked	  extensively	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  with	  the	  support	  of	  a	  population	  of	  wealthy	  conservative	  donors	  heavily	  invested	  in	  the	  Contra	  cause.	  Channell’s	  letters	  demonstrated	  his	  belief	  that	  an	  appearance	  of	  popular	  support	  would	  strengthen	  the	  President’s	  policy	  domestically	  and	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  The	  support	  existed	  in	  more	  than	  appearance,	  however,	  as	  conservative	  activists	  mobilized	  behind	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	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  William	  Casey.	  Memorandum.	  “Proposal	  to	  Use	  GeoMiliTech	  to	  Provide	  a	  Flow	  of	  Weapons	  to	  Insurgent	  Forces	  in	  Nicaragua,	  Afghanistan,	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  Cambodia	  and	  Ethiopia.”	  DNSA.	  December	  1985[?].	  Item	  Number:	  IC01933.	  105	  See	  Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive	  Numbers:	  IC00796,	  IC00923,	  IC01068	  among	  many	  others	  which	  document	  phone	  calls,	  calendar	  appointments,	  and	  memos	  in	  North’s	  personal	  materials	  where	  he	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  or	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  with	  Singlaub.	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combat	  the	  Central	  America	  peace	  movement	  and	  continue	  the	  intervention	  in	  communist	  friendly	  states	  like	  Nicaragua.	  These	  donors	  provided	  the	  foundation	  for	  Reagan	  Administration	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  at	  times	  even	  funded	  the	  Contra	  forces	  to	  continue	  a	  largely	  unpopular,	  and	  Congressionally	  prohibited,	  goal	  that	  the	  New	  Right	  held	  dear:	  elimination	  of	  an	  elected,	  leftist,	  and	  hostile	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Sandinista	  regime.	  Aircrafts	  were	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  big-­‐ticket	  items	  private	  benefactors	  were	  asked	  to	  purchase	  to	  support	  the	  Contra	  cause.106	  On	  June	  18,	  1985,	  Coors	  Brewing	  Company	  Chief	  Operating	  Officer	  Joseph	  Coors	  met	  with	  Oliver	  North	  and	  William	  Casey	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Administration’s	  actions	  in	  Nicaragua.107	  A	  few	  short	  months	  following	  this	  meeting,	  Coors	  transferred	  $65,000	  to	  a	  Swiss	  bank	  account	  used	  by	  North	  and	  Casey	  to	  funnel	  money	  to	  the	  Contras.108	  This	  money,	  provided	  by	  Coors	  after	  meeting	  personally	  with	  the	  state	  architects	  of	  Contra	  funding,	  purchased	  a	  U.S.	  Maule	  airplane	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  Contras	  in	  resupply	  missions.	  By	  purchasing	  items	  directly,	  as	  Coors	  did,	  private	  donors,	  under	  North’s	  careful	  coaching,	  circumvented	  the	  Boland	  Amendments’	  restriction	  of	  U.S.	  government	  funding	  to	  provide	  Administration-­‐backed	  support	  for	  the	  Contras.	  Interestingly,	  it	  appears	  the	  relationship	  initially	  built	  between	  Coors	  and	  North	  then	  transferred	  to	  Channell.	  Instead	  of	  continuing	  to	  meet	  with	  North	  directly,	  Channell’s	  personal	  calendar	  entries	  indicate	  that	  he	  assumed	  the	  contact	  point	  with	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  Holly	  Sklar,	  Washington’s	  War	  on	  Nicaragua	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  South	  End	  Press,	  1988),	  259.	  	  107	  Oliver	  North.	  Non-­‐Classifed	  North	  Calendar.	  “North	  Calendar	  for	  June	  18,	  1985.”	  DNSA.	  18	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  1985.	  Item	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  Joseph	  Coors	  to	  William	  Grant.	  Letter.	  “Bank	  Transfer	  of	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  to	  Switzerland	  to	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Coors	  following	  the	  donation.109	  While	  Coors,	  unlike	  Garwood,	  chose	  to	  keep	  his	  charity	  of	  choice	  private,	  his	  donation	  still	  underscores	  the	  involvement	  and	  investment	  of	  wealthy	  conservatives	  nationwide	  in	  Reagan’s	  top	  foreign	  policy	  goal.	  	  	  Like	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Contra	  forces	  also	  networked	  with	  influential	  individuals	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  people.	  Richard	  Miller,	  a	  Reagan	  campaign	  aide,	  founded	  International	  Business	  Communications	  (IBC)	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1984	  and	  quickly	  became	  partners	  with	  Frank	  Gomez,	  a	  retired	  U.S.	  Information	  Agency	  Official	  then	  associated	  with	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Office	  of	  Public	  Diplomacy	  for	  Latin	  America	  (S/LPD).	  Gomez	  and	  Miller	  together	  used	  the	  IBC	  as	  a	  front	  organization	  to	  supply	  contracting	  services	  to	  Channell	  and	  North.110	  This	  connection	  is	  of	  great	  significance	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  imposing	  policy	  on	  the	  Contras,	  but	  rather	  working	  with	  representatives	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  goal	  in	  Nicaragua:	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Sandinistas.	  	  In	  1985,	  Adolfo	  Calero,	  leader	  of	  Fuerza	  Democratica	  Nicaraguense	  (FDN),	  a	  Contra	  group,	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  Channell	  informing	  him	  that	  the	  Contras	  required	  over	  $500,000	  per	  month	  to	  continue	  their	  fighting.	  In	  the	  letter,	  Calero	  specified	  Miller	  and	  Gomez	  as	  Channell’s	  contact	  points	  for	  updates	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Contras.	  Although	  Gomez	  remained	  in	  a	  semi-­‐governmental	  role,	  as	  a	  private,	  well	  connected,	  citizen	  Miller	  successfully	  used	  his	  business	  as	  a	  middle	  ground	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Carl	  Channell.	  Calendar	  Entry.	  “Carl	  Channell’s	  Calendar	  for	  March	  3,	  1986.”	  DNSA.	  3	  March	  1986.	  Item	  Number:	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  U.S.	  Office	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  Management	  and	  Budget.	  Non-­‐Classified	  Miscellaneous	  Document.	  “Personal	  Qualification	  Statement:	  Submitted	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  Senior	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  Frank	  Gomez	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  Contract.”	  
DNSA.1	  February	  1984.	  Item	  Number:	  IC00308.	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implementation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  Instead	  of	  donating	  directly	  to	  other	  organizations,	  Miller	  created	  a	  business	  to	  serve	  and	  protect	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  Miller’s	  involvement	  demonstrates	  the	  contributions	  of	  private	  citizens	  in	  more	  ways	  besides	  financial;	  his	  organizational	  skills	  and	  connections	  allowed	  him	  to	  assist	  the	  Contras	  without	  possessing	  a	  formal	  role	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  	  Once	  Miller	  gained	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  Channell,	  he	  assisted	  in	  running	  the	  first	  White	  House	  event	  in	  1985	  for	  fundraising.	  North	  served	  as	  the	  keynote	  speaker,	  giving	  a	  brief	  presentation	  on	  the	  Contras	  and	  the	  policy	  issue.	  Then,	  Miller	  and	  Channell	  escorted	  donors	  to	  the	  Hay-­‐Adams	  Hotel	  across	  the	  street	  to	  solicit	  them	  for	  contributions.	  This	  isolated	  incident	  became,	  with	  Miller’s	  assistance,	  the	  standard	  process	  for	  Channell’s	  solicitation	  process.111	  	  North	  bowed	  out	  before	  donations	  were	  requested,	  providing	  the	  state	  with	  protection	  from	  liability.	  Then,	  the	  private	  individuals,	  immediately	  after	  North’s	  presentation,	  collected	  funds	  to	  be	  distributed	  through	  their	  own	  organizations	  with	  North’s	  direction	  and	  blessing.	  	  	  In	  these	  situations,	  Oliver	  North	  was	  not	  the	  careful	  craftsman,	  but	  rather	  a	  member	  of	  an	  elaborate	  fundraising	  cohort	  primarily	  operated	  by	  private,	  non-­‐state	  individuals.	  These	  individuals,	  from	  Garwood	  to	  Singlaub,	  operated	  in	  many	  different	  capacities	  but	  all	  acted	  to	  implement	  and	  create	  foreign	  policy	  outside	  of	  the	  state,	  a	  power	  typically	  associated	  with	  the	  Executive	  Branch.	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  influenced	  these	  individuals,	  providing	  a	  policy	  goal	  and	  assisting	  in	  its	  direction.	  The	  remarkable	  initiative	  of	  these	  private	  individuals	  to	  enact	  a	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  Richard	  Miller,	  Francis	  Gomez,	  Carl	  Channell,	  and	  John	  Ramsey.	  Transcript.	  “Transcript	  of	  Conversation	  between	  Richard	  Miller,	  Francis	  Gomez,	  Carl	  Channell,	  and	  John	  Ramsey	  at	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  Fundraising	  Dinner.”	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specific	  policy,	  however,	  demonstrates	  the	  capability	  of	  regular	  citizens	  to	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  policy	  through	  wealth,	  connections,	  or	  determination.	  This	  non-­‐state	  mobilization,	  occurring	  on	  a	  level	  likely	  unbeknownst	  to	  the	  President,	  allowed	  the	  military	  activities	  of	  the	  Contras	  to	  continue	  with	  U.S.	  support	  long	  after	  Congressional	  prohibitions	  on	  funding	  and	  arguably	  entirely	  without	  the	  explicit	  approval	  of	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief.	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Chapter	  3:	  It	  All	  Falls	  Down	  	  	   In	  October	  of	  1986,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  carefully	  constructed	  web	  of	  covert	  Contra	  funding	  began	  to	  unravel.	  On	  October	  fifth,	  Sandinista	  forces	  in	  Nicaragua	  gunned	  down	  a	  C-­‐123	  cargo	  airplane	  flown	  by	  Eugene	  Hasenfus,	  an	  American	  pilot.	  Hasenfus	  admitted	  he	  had	  been	  dropping	  weapons,	  among	  other	  supplies,	  to	  the	  Contras	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.	  Although	  documents	  on	  the	  aircraft	  linked	  the	  mission	  to	  the	  CIA,	  both	  the	  White	  House	  and	  CIA	  Director	  Casey	  denied	  the	  connection.112	  When	  the	  Sandinistas	  tried	  to	  return	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  other	  passengers,	  the	  U.S.	  refused	  to	  accept	  them,	  continuing	  to	  deny	  it	  was	  a	  private	  operation	  with	  no	  connection	  to	  the	  White	  House.113	  Hasenfus,	  the	  only	  survivor,	  remained	  in	  Sandinista	  custody	  until	  December.114	  This	  triggered	  a	  series	  of	  media	  investigations,	  which	  catalyzed	  Congressional	  investigations	  and	  ultimately	  the	  explosive	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair.	  	   Although	  the	  private	  donations	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  scandal	  and	  funding	  allowing	  Contra	  activities	  to	  continue	  stemmed	  from	  the	  donation	  of	  weapons	  from	  third	  party	  countries.	  After	  winning	  reelection	  in	  1984,	  Reagan	  had	  ordered	  sale	  of	  weapons	  to	  Iran,	  breaking	  the	  Arms	  Export	  Control	  Act,	  which	  prohibited	  transfer	  of	  U.S.	  arms	  without	  express	  permission	  of	  Congress,	  and	  then	  directly	  funneled	  the	  money	  generated	  to	  the	  Contras.	  Weapons	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  Michael	  Lynch	  and	  David	  Bogen.	  The	  Spectacle	  of	  History:	  Speech,	  Text,	  and	  Memory	  at	  the	  Iran-­
Contra	  Hearings.	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  3.	  	  113	  Sergio	  Ramirez,	  Adios	  Muchachos:	  A	  Memoir	  of	  the	  Sandinista	  Revolution	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  103.	  114	  Ibid,	  104	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were	  relayed	  through	  Israel,	  where	  they	  would	  deliver	  Israeli	  weapons	  to	  Iran	  to	  negotiate	  the	  release	  of	  hostages	  held	  by	  the	  radical	  Shiite	  Islamic	  group	  Hezbollah	  in	  Lebanon.	  Congress	  never	  received	  notice	  of	  this	  elaborate	  exchange.	  In	  November	  of	  1986,	  shortly	  after	  Hasenfus	  crashed	  in	  Nicaragua,	  a	  Lebanese	  paper	  published	  an	  exposé	  on	  the	  arms	  sales.115	  	  	   While,	  in	  monetary	  amount,	  the	  private	  donations	  did	  not	  rival	  the	  financial	  contributions	  of	  third	  party	  countries,	  the	  use	  of	  domestic	  actors	  to	  support	  a	  foreign	  policy	  remains	  significant	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  capability	  of	  private	  U.S.	  citizens	  to	  act	  outside	  of	  traditional	  democratic	  channels,	  such	  as	  voting,	  to	  influence	  and	  shape	  the	  policy	  process.	  In	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair,	  most	  publicity	  focused	  on	  the	  involvement	  of	  third	  party	  countries,	  but	  in	  the	  age	  of	  globalization,	  the	  impact	  of	  non-­‐state	  domestic	  actors	  is	  historically	  significant	  because	  it	  illustrates	  the	  complex	  and	  fluid	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government−not	  only	  between	  the	  Executive,	  the	  bureaucracy	  within	  the	  Administration,	  and	  ordinary	  citizens.	  The	  involvement	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  indicated	  the	  evolution	  of	  new	  channels	  of	  policy	  creation	  that	  remains	  in	  the	  current	  era,	  indicating	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  involvement	  irrespective	  of	  monetary	  amounts.	  	  Initial	  inquires,	  although	  unsuccessful,	  grew	  from	  articles	  in	  the	  press	  about	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Contras	  and	  their	  continued	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  prior	  chapter,	  private	  donors,	  unaware	  they	  were	  engaging	  in	  illegal	  covert	  activity,	  campaigned	  heavily	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause	  and	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  Lawrence	  E.	  Walsh,	  Firewall:	  The	  Iran-­Contra	  Conspiracy	  and	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networked	  to	  encourage	  more	  donations.116	  In	  May	  of	  1986,	  shortly	  before	  officially	  inquiries	  passed,	  the	  Miami	  Herald	  published	  an	  article	  accusing	  North	  of	  knowingly	  and	  directly	  violating	  the	  Boland	  Amendments.117	  These	  accusations	  startled	  the	  NSC	  and	  White	  House,	  creating	  the	  first	  stirs	  of	  scandal	  amongst	  the	  administration.	  	  Official	  investigation	  into	  Contra	  support	  began	  with	  Congressional	  action,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  House	  Resolution	  485,	  which	  passed	  on	  June	  24,	  1986.	  This	  resolution	  demanded	  the	  President	  submit	  any	  documents	  concerning	  Oliver	  North’s	  communication	  with	  any	  Contra	  officials	  and	  North’s	  communication	  with	  other	  prominent	  organizers,	  like	  Major	  General	  John	  K.	  Singlaub.118	  This	  investigation	  resulted	  partially	  out	  of	  personal	  vendetta	  against	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  Oliver	  North	  by	  Democratic	  House	  members.	  A	  NSC	  memorandum	  to	  Poindexter	  accused	  Representative	  Ron	  Coleman	  (D,	  TX)	  of	  filing	  H.Res.485	  on	  behalf	  of	  Representative	  Michael	  Barnes	  (D,	  MD),	  who	  had	  attempted	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  activities	  of	  North	  for	  the	  past	  year	  unsuccessfully.119	  The	  memorandum	  subtly	  mocks	  the	  inquiry	  efforts	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Representatives,	  exuding	  confidence	  that	  no	  records	  would	  be	  released.	  The	  White	  House	  prepared	  recommended	  answers	  for	  their	  officials	  when	  the	  press	  asked	  why	  the	  documents	  were	  not	  released,	  assuring	  the	  press	  and	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  Oliver	  North,	  the	  NSC,	  and	  the	  White	  House	  had	  been	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  spirit	  and	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  Elliot	  Abrams	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  Morton	  Abromowitz.	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  Story	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  Donors	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  U.S.	  Congress.	  Unclassified	  Resolution.	  “House	  Resolution	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  485.”	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  1986.	  Item	  Number:	  IC03050.	  	  119	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  John	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  Resolution	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  Col.	  North.”	  DNSA.	  21	  July	  1986.	  Item	  Number:	  IC03168.	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letter	  of	  the	  law	  regarding	  actions	  in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  recommended	  answer	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  imply	  that	  this	  inquiry	  was	  a	  political	  tool	  against	  the	  White	  House	  strategically	  timed	  around	  a	  contra	  aid	  vote	  in	  Congress.120	  As	  congressional	  support	  mobilized	  for	  a	  witch	  hunt	  in	  the	  NSC,	  North	  and	  his	  cohorts	  dodged	  initial	  efforts	  at	  investigation,	  continuing	  to	  believe	  their	  activities	  would	  remain	  entirely	  secret.	  To	  try	  to	  avoid	  a	  scandal,	  Reagan	  held	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  November	  25,	  1986	  to	  announce	  that	  North	  had	  been	  fired	  and	  Poindexter	  was	  resigning.121	  Yet	  this	  failed	  to	  control	  the	  investigations	  and	  media	  whirlwind.	  	   In	  March	  of	  1987,	  the	  General	  Accounting	  Office	  (GAO)	  began	  investigations	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Office	  of	  Public	  Diplomacy	  of	  Latin	  America	  (S/LPD).	  In	  a	  series	  of	  two	  reports,	  published	  on	  September	  30,	  1987	  and	  October	  30,	  1987,	  the	  GAO	  revealed	  funds	  were	  being	  used	  for	  publicity	  and	  propaganda	  purposes	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  Contras	  not	  authorized	  by	  Congress.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  a	  State	  Department	  Office	  of	  Inspector	  General	  report	  revealed	  that	  military	  contracts	  awarded	  to	  International	  Business	  Communications	  (IBC)	  were	  questionable	  and	  classified	  as	  SECRET	  to	  avoid	  public	  disclosure.	  These	  reports,	  summarized	  in	  Staff	  Report	  on	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  Intelligence	  Community	  Involvement	  in	  Domestic	  Activities	  Related	  to	  the	  Iran/Contra	  Affair,	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  “S/LPD	  was	  set	  up	  and	  managed	  by	  operatives	  in	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC)	  who	  maintained	  close	  ties	  with	  Oliver	  North	  and	  former	  CIA	  Director	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Casey.”122	  This	  report	  demonstrates	  that	  North,	  through	  his	  post	  at	  the	  NSC,	  employed	  his	  allies	  in	  the	  S/LPD	  to	  engage	  his	  resources	  in	  lobbying	  and	  propaganda	  in	  support	  of	  pro-­‐Contra	  policies.	  Simultaneously,	  North	  awarded	  military	  contracts	  to	  friendly	  suppliers	  at	  the	  IBC	  who	  in	  return	  put	  him	  in	  contact	  with	  powerful	  political	  organizers	  like	  Channell	  who	  were	  vital	  to	  maintaining	  the	  	  strength	  of	  North’s	  efforts.123	  This	  network	  served	  to	  further	  a	  policy	  supported	  by	  ordinary	  citizens,	  political	  organizers,	  and	  bureaucrats	  without	  navigating	  the	  traditional	  democratic	  channels	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	   The	  first	  Contra	  funding	  figure	  to	  face	  criminal	  consequences	  was	  Carl	  “Spitz”	  Channell.	  On	  April	  28,	  1987,	  Channell	  plead	  guilty	  to	  one	  count	  of	  defrauding	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  through	  his	  activities	  with	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Liberty	  (NEPL)	  by	  soliciting	  non-­‐humanitarian	  aid	  for	  the	  Contras.124	  The	  NEPL	  operated	  successfully	  due	  to	  its	  tax-­‐exempt	  status,	  gaining	  donors	  and	  sympathetic	  ears,	  but	  acted	  outside	  of	  its	  legal	  bounds	  in	  using	  the	  funds	  acquired.	  In	  his	  plea	  bargain	  hearings,	  Channell	  listed	  North	  and	  Richard	  Miller	  as	  co-­‐conspirators,	  fueling	  the	  witch-­‐hunt	  for	  North	  and	  demonstrating	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  funding	  network.	  The	  following	  day,	  Miller,	  head	  of	  International	  Business	  Communications	  (IBC)	  plead	  guilty	  to	  conspiring	  to	  defraud	  the	  IRS	  through	  the	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  Foreign	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  1988.	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  R.	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NEPL.125	  Miller	  and	  Channell’s	  political	  moments	  quickly	  ended	  as	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  escalated	  into	  national	  scandal.	  	  	   Although	  Channell,	  a	  prominent	  organizer	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  faced	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  involvement,	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  the	  non-­‐state	  donors	  remained	  largely	  uninvolved.	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  focused	  on	  the	  public	  actors	  and	  therefore	  the	  support	  network	  of	  wealthy	  non-­‐state	  actors	  remained	  unscathed	  in	  the	  political	  battles.	  Lack	  of	  criminal	  charges,	  however,	  does	  not	  vacate	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  actors	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  scandal.	  These	  private	  individuals	  provided	  the	  resources,	  enthusiasm,	  and	  connections	  necessary	  for	  the	  Contra	  movement	  to	  appear	  popularly	  supported	  to	  a	  determined	  Reagan	  Administration.	  While	  political	  actors,	  and	  non-­‐state	  organizers,	  assumed	  the	  majority	  of	  public	  attention,	  these	  non-­‐state	  actors	  remained	  quietly	  behind	  the	  scenes	  in	  most	  cases,	  allowing	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  precedent	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  influence	  U.S.	  policy	  without	  fear	  of	  repercussions.	  Criminal	  charges	  do	  not	  determine	  the	  significance	  of	  an	  individual,	  but	  rather	  demonstrate	  the	  ability	  of	  some	  actors	  to	  remain	  entirely	  unknown	  to	  the	  American	  public	  while	  still	  shaping	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  	   Congressional	  hearings	  began	  in	  May	  of	  1987,	  with	  North	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  public	  spectacle.	  Rather	  than	  remarkable	  for	  their	  content,	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  congressional	  hearings	  became	  legendary	  for	  the	  resulting	  outpouring	  of	  support	  and	  attention	  for	  North.126	  After	  years	  of	  covert	  action,	  manipulation	  of	  legislation,	  and	  networking	  with	  political	  organizers,	  North’s	  role	  became	  that	  of	  an	  American	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  Criminal	  Information.	  “United	  States	  of	  America	  v.	  Richard	  R.	  Miller.”	  DNSA.	  29	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  1987.	  Item	  Number:	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  126	  Lynch	  &	  Bogen,	  4.	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icon,	  not	  a	  popular	  villain.	  North	  appeared	  dressed	  in	  his	  Marine	  regalia,	  using	  common	  language	  to	  assert	  that	  he	  was	  simply	  there	  to	  tell	  the	  truth	  while	  navigating	  manipulative	  interrogators.127	  North	  accurately	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  a	  simple	  man	  with	  simple	  goals	  passed	  down	  by	  his	  commander	  and	  chief.	  In	  Michael	  Lynch	  and	  David	  Bogen’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  hearings,	  quoting	  a	  U.S.	  News	  
and	  World	  Report	  article,	  the	  authors	  depict	  North’s	  emergence	  as	  “a	  national	  hero,	  [who]	  became	  a	  national	  sensation	  accomplishing	  a	  stunning	  role	  reversal	  from	  the	  accused	  to	  the	  accuser.”128	  Once	  the	  veil	  of	  secrecy	  was	  ripped	  away,	  North’s	  “neat	  idea”	  became	  a	  scandal	  that	  defined	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  With	  the	  administration	  in	  chaos,	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Poindexter,	  North,	  and	  White	  House	  chief	  of	  stall	  Donald	  Regan	  were	  fired	  in	  quick	  succession.	  William	  Casey	  suffered	  a	  stroke,	  and	  after	  brain	  surgery	  died	  within	  months.	  McFarlane	  even	  attempted	  suicide.129	  In	  the	  final	  months	  of	  1986	  and	  throughout	  1987,	  Reagan’s	  poll	  numbers	  reflected	  a	  twenty-­‐percentage	  point	  drop	  in	  approval	  from	  prior	  months.130	  While	  in	  office,	  approval	  ratings	  floated	  in	  the	  low	  50’s,	  but,	  over	  time,	  Reagan’s	  approval	  ratings	  have	  increased.	  Gallup	  conducted	  a	  poll	  in	  2002	  and	  retrospectively	  73%	  of	  people	  approved	  of	  the	  way	  Reagan	  handled	  his	  presidency.131	  	  	  Although	  Reagan	  left	  office	  with	  lower	  poll	  numbers	  than	  his	  average	  approval	  rating,	  historians	  still	  struggle	  to	  reconcile	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐	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  Newport,	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  Jeffrey	  Jones,	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  Lydia	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Contra	  Scandal	  on	  the	  Reagan	  legacy.	  In	  popular	  discussion,	  the	  media	  often	  discusses	  Reagan	  as	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  American	  presidents.	  Reagan’s	  continued	  strong	  reputation	  stems	  primarily	  from	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  his	  presidency.	  The	  American	  people	  identified	  Reagan’s	  foreign	  policy	  as	  successful	  due	  to	  prioritization	  of	  US	  interests,	  employing	  idealist	  rhetoric	  and	  policies	  when	  Communism	  was	  not	  a	  direct	  threat,	  or	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  Communism,	  and	  maintaining	  a	  realist	  outlook	  when	  tackling	  the	  Communism	  globally.132	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal,	  therefore,	  was	  a	  mere	  stain	  on	  the	  reputation	  of	  Reagan	  and	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  his	  lasting	  legacy,	  which	  remained	  defined	  by	  the	  popular	  association	  of	  Reagan	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  affair	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  use	  of	  low-­‐level	  operatives	  in	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  to	  achieve	  unpopular	  goals	  or	  simply	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  efficiency.	  North’s	  relatively	  low	  ranking	  position	  in	  the	  bureaucratic	  NSC	  allowed	  him	  to	  escape	  scrutiny	  early	  on	  and	  seamless	  transition	  through	  many	  circles	  of	  political	  society	  in	  soliciting	  donations	  and	  forming	  political	  networks.	  Surprisingly	  though,	  Reagan	  also	  used	  low-­‐level	  officials	  in	  other	  foreign	  policy	  missions.	  Plans	  for	  summit	  meetings	  with	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  sometimes	  went	  through	  a	  female	  American	  author	  who	  had	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Reagan	  and	  a	  KGB	  official	  in	  Moscow	  instead	  of	  through	  the	  secretary	  of	  state.133	  These	  two	  incidents,	  one	  that	  evolved	  into	  a	  national	  scandal	  and	  one	  that	  still	  remains	  largely	  unknown,	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  "The	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  Human	  Rights,"	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  64,	  no.	  5	  (1986).;	  Tony	  Smith,	  America’s	  Mission:	  The	  US	  and	  the	  Worldwide	  Struggle	  for	  Democracy	  in	  the	  20th	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  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994).;	  Morris	  Morley	  ,	  and	  Chris	  McGillion,	  "Soldiering	  On:	  The	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  Redemocratisation	  in	  Chile,	  1983-­‐1986,"	  Bulletin	  of	  Latin	  American	  
Research,	  25,	  no.	  1	  (2006).	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demonstrate	  the	  continued	  use	  of	  private	  secret	  intermediaries	  when	  implementing	  foreign	  policy.	  Although	  this	  broader	  topic	  goes	  beyond	  this	  thesis,	  the	  historical	  narrative	  would	  benefit	  from	  further	  analysis	  of	  covert	  interactions	  as	  documentation	  becomes	  declassified.	  Through	  a	  complex,	  cohesive	  effort	  by	  Reagan	  Administration	  officials,	  including	  Oliver	  North,	  William	  Casey,	  Robert	  McFarlane,	  and	  non-­‐state	  organizers,	  private	  donors,	  and	  well-­‐connected	  political	  activists,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  enabled	  continued	  support	  of	  the	  Contras	  in	  a	  period	  of	  time	  in	  which	  the	  Boland	  Amendments	  specifically	  prohibited	  such	  action.	  While	  impossible	  to	  quantify,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  their	  support	  for	  North	  through	  political	  organizations	  clearly	  furthered	  a	  Congressionally	  banned	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  through	  the	  purchase	  of	  planes,	  cohesive	  advertising	  efforts,	  and	  functions	  like	  dinners	  in	  which	  Reagan	  and	  his	  support	  staff	  were	  directed	  to	  continue	  pro-­‐Contra	  rhetoric	  and	  New	  Right	  ideology.	  Both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  were	  necessary	  components	  in	  this	  system,	  but	  the	  introduction	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  foreign	  policy	  demonstrates	  an	  unprecedented	  political	  involvement	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  These	  non-­‐state	  actors	  faced	  dramatically	  fewer	  consequences	  than	  North	  and	  Reagan,	  allowing	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  to	  potentially	  continue	  in	  the	  modern	  political	  era.	  	  	  Although	  the	  legality	  of	  Contra	  support	  and	  the	  scandal	  did	  not	  ruin	  Reagan’s	  reputation,	  it	  catapulted	  North	  into	  the	  center	  of	  a	  political	  storm.	  Largely	  due	  to	  a	  scheme	  in	  which	  third	  party	  countries,	  like	  Israel	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  funded	  arms	  resupply	  missions	  for	  the	  Contras,	  North	  became	  a	  target	  for	  the	  media	  whirlwind.	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Reagan	  conferred	  to	  North—through	  limited	  dialogue,	  an	  ideological	  platform,	  and	  his	  subordinates—that	  he	  should	  do	  anything	  in	  his	  power	  to	  keep	  the	  Contra	  forces	  together	  and	  in	  strong	  opposition	  to	  the	  Sandinistas.	  North	  recognized	  he	  would	  “stand	  in	  the	  corner	  and	  sit	  on	  his	  head”	  if	  Reagan	  asked	  him,	  and	  this	  mentality	  allowed	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal	  to	  become	  a	  display	  of	  American	  patriotism	  rather	  than	  deceitful	  government	  military	  action.134	  When	  the	  scandal	  erupted,	  Reagan	  remained	  relatively	  unscathed,	  and	  North	  became	  a	  celebrity	  and	  took	  the	  blame.	  	  The	  narrative	  of	  the	  Contra	  funding	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  motivated	  North.	  North	  believed	  that	  his	  ultimate	  superior,	  his	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  ordered	  him	  to	  employ	  whatever	  means	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  Contra	  forces	  alive	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  protect	  the	  freedom	  of	  America	  from	  the	  leftist	  influence	  of	  the	  Communists	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  As	  the	  hearings	  revealed,	  the	  legality	  became	  insignificant	  to	  the	  populace,	  and	  an	  American	  hero	  was	  born	  from	  the	  shrouds	  of	  covert	  military	  force.	  	  	   In	  the	  mess	  of	  national	  scandal,	  the	  path	  of	  policy	  formation	  lost	  significance	  compared	  to	  what	  was	  actually	  occurring	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Activists	  championed	  the	  human	  rights	  cause,	  Democrats	  sought	  to	  destroy	  Reagan	  and	  North,	  and	  citizens	  everywhere	  simultaneously	  watched	  the	  scandal	  with	  disgust	  at	  awe	  at	  the	  spectacle	  broadcasted	  to	  thousands	  of	  televisions	  nationwide.	  Instead	  of	  a	  strong	  executive	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  who	  solely	  commanded	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  military	  power	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Reagan	  emerged	  as	  a	  somewhat	  clueless	  yet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Robert	  Pastor,	  "The	  War	  Between	  Branches:	  Explaining	  U.S.	  Policy	  Toward	  Nicaragua,	  1979-­‐89,"	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy,	  ed.	  Richard	  Sobel	  (Maryland:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  1993),	  237.	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somehow	  involved	  ambiguous	  authority	  figure.	  Speculation	  ran	  wild,	  from	  Saturday	  
Night	  Live	  skits	  to	  conspiracy	  theory	  books	  still	  in	  circulation.135	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  exposed	  the	  false	  reality	  of	  an	  executive	  monopoly	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  military	  force.	  Private	  citizens,	  through	  elaborate	  networks	  of	  political	  organizers	  and	  bureaucrats,	  became	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  formation.	  Without	  their	  dollars	  to	  finance	  lobbying	  campaigns	  and	  even	  arms	  drops,	  the	  policy	  could	  not	  have	  sustained	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did.	  At	  an	  economic	  summit	  in	  1989,	  Reagan	  still	  insisted	  his	  ignorance	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  his	  aides	  like	  North	  and	  McFarlane	  in	  organizing	  support	  for	  the	  Contras.136	  His	  persistence	  could	  indicate	  he	  still	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  cover	  his	  tracks,	  but	  I	  argue	  that	  his	  reluctance	  to	  accept	  blame	  may	  indicate	  that	  other	  actors	  shaped	  the	  policy	  in	  a	  direction	  he	  never	  anticipated	  or	  requested.	  The	  delicate	  balance	  of	  private	  funding,	  subsisting	  due	  to	  an	  illegal,	  complex,	  and	  not	  entirely	  public	  network,	  created	  a	  policy	  internationally	  perceived	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Government,	  demonstrating	  the	  ability	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  shape	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  fully	  maintain	  control	  over	  its	  trajectory.	  Since	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  prominent	  organizers,	  also	  remained	  shielded	  from	  legal	  charges,	  their	  ability	  to	  effective	  engage,	  shape,	  and	  implement	  foreign	  policy	  as	  a	  piece	  in	  an	  extensive	  political	  network	  remained	  intact	  as	  a	  precedent	  for	  possible	  later	  administrations.	  	  	   This	  relationship	  between	  the	  New	  Right	  political	  activists,	  who	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  government,	  lobbying	  and	  raising	  money	  continued	  throughout	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  See	  Saturday	  Night	  Live,	  “President	  Reagan	  Mastermind.”	  http://www.hulu.com/watch/4174;	  Lawrence	  E.	  Walsh,	  Firewall:	  The	  Iran-­Contra	  Conspiracy	  and	  Cover-­Up	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  Inc.,	  1997).	  	  136	  Mann,	  196.	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War	  era	  and	  continues	  to	  shape	  American	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policy.	  In	  2010,	  the	  landmark	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  Citizen’s	  United	  v.	  Federal	  Election	  Commission	  (558	  U.S.	  310)	  established	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  could	  not	  restrict	  monetary	  contributions	  from	  corporations	  and	  unions	  to	  campaigns	  because	  they	  represented	  a	  form	  of	  free	  political	  speech	  under	  the	  1st	  Amendment.	  This	  decision	  led	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  Political	  Action	  Committees	  (PACs)	  in	  the	  2012	  election	  that	  supplied	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  funding	  to	  candidates	  to	  be	  used	  in	  campaigns	  and	  lobbying.	  Arguably,	  this	  trend	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  Reagan	  era	  and	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  New	  Right,	  when	  a	  blueprint	  was	  established,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  this	  thesis,	  to	  influence	  policy	  domestically	  and	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  through	  undisclosed	  financial	  contributions	  from	  ordinary	  citizens.	  The	  blur	  between	  private	  and	  public	  actors	  began	  in	  the	  1980’s	  and	  has	  continued	  into	  the	  present	  era,	  allowing	  new	  actors	  to	  shape	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  in	  unprecedented.	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